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PERPETUAL CONSERVATION
During the past two decades, Congress has enacted significant
legislative initiatives designed to reduce degradation of our environ-
ment. These initiatives have included special efforts to conserve our
land resource. To preserve the appropriate balance of power be-
tween the federal government and the states, Congress has striven
to avoid the appearance of federal land use "regulation."' For ex-
ample, the legislative history of the conservation provisions in the
Food Security Act of 19852 ("1985 Farm Bill") expressly notes
that the "bill does not.., regulate the u.e of private, or non-
Federal land."3 The government can readily control land uses, and
avoid the complex issues arising When federal programs affect
states' rights or private property rights, by purchasing full fee title
to environmentally significant lands. However, purchasing full fee
title is an expensive means of achieving conservation or preserva-
tion goals.4 Thus, to protect environmentally significant aspects of
the land resource, the government has shifted its focus to the ac-
quisition of less costly easements from private landowners.5
Easements can be created to allow the federal government to
restrict environmentally degrading uses of the land.6 Because the
easements are purchased from landowners who voluntarily agree to
such restrictions, the government can influence land use without
directly regulating it.7 Easements have been highly praised by con-
servation and environmental interest groups as an ideal device to
achieve conservation and preservation goals.8 The political feasi-
I. See discussion infra part H.A.
2. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354, 1504-18 (1985) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of Titles 7 and 16 of the United States Code).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 88 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1192. Similarly, the Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981 expressly
states that it does "not authorize the Federal Government in any way to regulate the use
of private or non-Federal land, or in any way affect the property rights of owners of such
land." 7 U.S.C.A. § 4208(a) (West 1988).
4. See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in
the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 443-46
(1984) (noting that direct and indirect costs of purchasing fee title make purchasing
servitudes an economically superior conservation technique).
5. Although the government historically has used easement acquisition programs for
various purposes, the trend toward conserving or preserving diverse land resources through
easements is evidenced by the multitude of recently established federal conservation pro-
grams which include easement acquisition provisions. See discussion infra part LB.2.
6. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
7. See generally JOHN W. BRUCE & JAmES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS
AND LICENSEs IN LAND 1 11.02 (1988) (noting that the grantor of a conservation ease-
ment may use property for any purposes not inconsistent with the easement).
8. See Infra notes 45, 51-55 and accompanying text (describing distinction between
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bility of federal easement acquisition programs is aptly illustrated
by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 19909
("1990 Farm Bill"), which has greatly expanded the government's
use of easements to protect environmentally significant lands, in-
cluding wetlands, highly erodible croplands, forestlands, wildlife
habitats, farmland, shelterbelts and windbreaks." Landowner ac-
ceptance of easement acquisition programs is evidenced by the first
year's response to the Wetlands Reserve Program 1 - 2,730 land-
owners indicated a willingness to enroll 466,000 acres in the pro-
gram. 1
2
Accordingly, it is important to determine how Congress can
best utilize land use restriction easements to achieve lasting conser-
vation and preservation of the land resource. Congress has called
for an evaluation of federal conservation programs; specifically,
Congress has sought to overcome obstacles to federal conservation
goals. 3 One such obstacle is uncertainty in the law governing the
duration of federal land use restriction easements. While the Forest-
ry Title of the 1990 Farm Bill requires easements to be held in
perpetuity and preempts state law limits on duration, 14 the Conser-
vation Title of the 1990 Farm Bill incorporates state law to govern
the maximum allowable duration. '5 No other acquisition program
expressly addresses whether federal law overrides state limitations
on duration.1
6
Use of state law to govern the maximum duration of ease-
ments will hinder the federal government's ability to advance con-
servation goals efficiently and effectively. In addition to the ineffi-
conservation and preservation and discussing support among environmental interest groups
for land use restriction easements).
9. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 7 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.).
10. See discussion infra part I.B.2.
11. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3837-3837f (West Supp. 1992); see infra notes 101-08 and accom-
panying text.
12. Farmers Offer Acreage for Wetlands Restoration, Indiana Agrinews, July 17, 1992,
at 6; see Thomas Grier, Conservation Easements: Michigan's Land Preservation Tool of
the 1990's, 69 U. DET. L. REV. 193, 197-98 n.47 (1991) (noting enrollment of four mil-
lion acres of farmland under the Michigan Farmland and Open Space Preservation Act).
13. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 3846 (West Supp. 1992) (directing the Secretary of Agriculture
to prepare a report evaluating conservation programs and policies).
14. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2103c(k)(2) (West Supp. 1992); see also infra note 216 and accom-
panying text.
15. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3837a(e)(2), 3839(a) (West Supp. 1992); see also infra note 215
and accompanying text.
16. See discussion infra part II.B.
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ciencies of compliance with diverse state laws, state laws may
preclude the acquisition of easements in perpetuity.17 Even in
those states which permit restrictive land use easements to be held
in perpetuity, incorporation of state law may hinder federal pro-
grams because state law may place limits on qualified holders of
easements or purposes for which easements may be created.1 8 Fur-
ther, incorporation of state law may permit a state to defeat federal
programs simply by modifying its laws.19
Accordingly, federal programs should authorize acquisition of
perpetual easements and preempt state laws regulating their dura-
tion. This policy will enhance conservation goals in programs
which use easements to restrict harmful uses of the land re-
source.2" However, federal imposition of these requirements raises
fundamental federalism concerns. May the federal government
acquire a property right that is not a cognizable aspect of the
landowner's "bundle of rights" under state law? Even if the federal
government may acquire a property right not recognized by state
law, may the federal government convey that right to private non-
profit entities, along with the ability to enforce its terms? Certainly,
if a federal law authorizing perpetual easements is a proper exer-
cise of congressional powers, it will preempt state laws.21 How-
ever, because state laws traditionally control the acquisition and
transfer of property, and define the resulting rights and responsibili-
ties,' federal preemption of state property law may be perceived
as an intrusion on state sovereignty which violates constitutional
limitations.
This article examines the constitutional and policy concerns
surrounding federal use of perpetual land use restrictive easements
to achieve conservation goals. Section I explains the use of ease-
ments for conservation or preservation purposes and provides an
17. See infra notes 39-42, 457-61 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 462-65 and accompanying text.
19. States may be overly responsive to private interests dissatisfied with encumbrances
on land use. See infra notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
20. This article uses the term -perpetual- to mean that the interest is intended to be
continuous and of unlimited duration. BLACK'S LAW DICrnONARY 1140 (6th ed. 1990).
However, the term can be used in conjunction with provisions permitting modification or
termination of the interest under certain circumstances. See infra notes 485-87 and accom-
panying text.
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. V-, cl. 2.
22. The states' traditional control over property law is used to justify the incorporation
of state law in the interpretation of federal legislation. See infra notes 225, 403-13 and
accompanying text.
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overview of their use in federal agricultural programs. Section H
explains why easement acquisition programs are more appropriate
than direct land use regulation as a means to conserve environmen-
tally significant aspects of the land resource.
Section HI analyzes federalism issues and concludes that feder-
al preemption of state limitations on the duration of easements is a
proper exercise of congressional spending and property power.
Moreover, this exercise of congressional power does not violate
constitutional limitations intended to protect state sovereignty. Fi-
nally, section IV crafts a framework for the policy decision. Even
if the exercise of congressional power is constitutional, Congress
should consider the policy questions before enacting legislation that
intrudes into traditional areas of state authority. After examining
the policy issues, the article concludes that federal law should
require perpetual easements and preempt state limitations on dura-
tion.
I. OVERVIEW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A. Land Use Restriction Easements
Land use restriction easements ("LUREs") are an innovative
application of the private land use arrangements traditionally recog-
nized at common law.' An easement is a non-possessory interest
in another's land, generally entitling the easement holder to use the
land or to control its use.24 An easement typically grants an affir-
mative right to the easement holder;2 however, in the case of a
LURE, the easement conveys a negative restriction on the landown-
er who grants the easement.26 In other words, the landowner vol-
23. Private land use arrangements may take the form of easements, real covenants, or
equitable servitudes. See generally GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGE-
MENTS § 1.01 (1990) ("Easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes are used to
allocate non-possessory rights in the land of another."). While historically courts have
viewed these interests differently, for this article the primary significance of such arrange-
ments is the resulting land use restrictions imposed. See i. (noting that while courts have
regarded easements, real covenants and equitable servitudes as independent areas of the
law, recent scholarship has advocated unification of these doctrines). Rather than use com-
mon law nomenclature, this article adopts the more modem term "land use restriction
easement.- The acronym "LURE" is appropriate given the federal government's use of
LUREs as an "incentive" to promote voluntary modification of land use.
24. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) Op PROPERTY § 450 (1944) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
25. See id. § 451 (an affirmative easement entitles the owner to enter upon or use the
grantor's land for a prescribed activity).
26. For this reason, a LURE is deemed a negative easement. See Andrew Dana & Mi-
chael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 2,
[Vol. 43:401
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untarily agrees to limit his use of the land to conserve its resources
or preserve its unique character.27
The common law traditionally disfavored negative restrictions
on land as unduly burdensome on free alienation. 28  Free
alienability of land was an important tradition in post-feudal and
pre-industrial England:29 because a later easement holder might
not be a party to the original transfer, and because there was no
title registry, a later purchaser might have difficulty in discovering
the existence of a negative easement?0 In addition, common law
courts are reluctant to enforce negative easements unlike those
traditionally permitted, such as easements for light or air which
clearly benefit the dominant estate.3'
Further, LUREs are generally characterized as in gross, rather
than appurtenant to an adjacent parcel of land. 2 Since a LURE
does not benefit any identifiable land, it is more akin to a personal
12-13 (1989) (noting that conservation easements are "fundamentally different" from affir-
mative easements because they disallow conduct by the landowner, rather than permit
activity by the easement holder); Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Authority for Federal Acquisi-
tion of Conservation Easements to Provide Agricultural Credit Relief, 35 DRAKE L. REV.
477, 484-85 (1985-86) (recognizing that a negative easement gives the holder the right to
restrict the landowner's use of property).
27. See Komgold, supra note 4, at 435 ("Essentially, a conservation servitude is a
negative restriction on land prohibiting the landowner from acting in a way that would
alter the existing natural, open, scenic, or ecological condition of the land."); Kemble H.
Garret, Note, Conservation Easements: The Greening of America?, 73 KY. L.J 255, 256
(1984-85).
.28. See generally Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of
Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNE.L L. REV. 928
(1988) (discussing traditional common law doctrine which disfavored benefits in gross to
promote alienability of land).
29. See Olin L. Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 MICH. L. REv. 12,
14-19 (1978) (reviewing the legal impediments erected by English courts to prevent "run-
ning" of land use restrictions and promote alienability of property).
30. See Ellen E. Katz, Conserving the Nation's Heritage Using the Uniform Conser-
vation Easement Act, 43 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 369, 377 (1986).
31. See, e.g., Petersen v. Friedman, 328 P.2d 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (compelling re-
moval of television antennae and aerials which violated express easements of light, air
and unobstructed view). Common law traditionally allowed only the following types of
negative easements: (1) easements restricting the blockage of light and air to a building;
(2) easements restricting removal of subjacent or lateral support for a building; and (3)
easements restricting interference with the flow of an artificial stream. Dana & Ramsey,
supra note 26, at 13. Modem courts have also recognized "view easements" and "solar
easements." Id.
32. Hamilton, supra note 26, at 485. Appurtenant easements benefit a specific parcel of
land, known as the dominant estate, usually adjacent to the burdened or servient estate of
the easement grantor. RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 453. In gross easements benefit an
individual personally, rather than as owner of an identified parcel of land. Id. § 454.
Thus, LUREs possess the characteristics of negative or restrictive easements in gross.
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agreement.33 Traditionally, courts have restricted the assignment or
transferability of easements in gross to protect innocent purchas-
ers.
34
Despite the common law tradition, LUREs have proliferated in
recent years as a means of conserving or preserving historical and
environmental aspects of real property. Recognizing growing public
support for such efforts, several state legislatures have enacted
statutes validating LUREs and vitiating issues raised by application
of the common law. 35 Some state statutes are modeled after the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act ("UCEA") promulgated in
1981.36 The UCEA defines a "conservation easement" as:
[A] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property
imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes
of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or
open-space values of real property, assuring its availability
for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, pro-
tecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or
water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural,
archeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
37
Further, the UCEA states that a conservation easement is valid
even though it is not appurtenant, is assignable, is not traditionally
recognized at common law, imposes a negative burden, does not
touch or concern real property, and is without privity of estate or
contract.
3
33. See Katz, supra note 30, at 382.
34. Traditionally, American law has restricted the alienability of easements in gross,
permitting assignability only when the easement is created for a "commercial" purpose.
Susan F. French, Toward A Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands,
55 S. CAL L. REV. 1261, 1268 (1981-82). A minority of states disfavor the transfer of
all easements in gross. See Judith S.H. Atherton, An Assessment of Conservation Ease-
ments: One Method of Protecting Utah's Landscape, 6 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 55, 58 n.4
(1985) (surveying various state statutes governing transfer of easements in gross). The
rationale for the restrictive view is that easements should be tied to another parcel of land
so that the benefits of the easement flow to a later owner of adjacent property. See Katz,
supra note 30, at 382.
35. See infra notes 456-59 and accompanying text; see also Atherton, supra note 34,
at 86-87 (appendix listing state conservation statutes); Hamilton, supra note 22, at 525-27
(appendix listing state statutes permitting LUREs).
36. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 70 (West Supp. 1992).
37. Id. § 1(1).
38. Id. § 4(1)-(7). Some of the issues vitiated stemmed from the common law doc-
trines of real covenants or equitable servitudes, in addition to common law easement
doctrines. See supra note 23. See generally Katz, supra note 30, at 377-82 (discussing
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Despite the effort to promote uniformity, state statutes authoriz-
ing LUREs for conservation or preservation purposes are di-
verse.39 These statutes employ divergent provisions regarding vari-
ous facets of LUREs including their creation, authorized purposes,
qualified holders, acceptance, duration, enforcement, modification,
and termination.4 Thus, state statutes do not resolve all obstacles
to judicial enforcement of LUREs, particularly LUREs held by the
federal government or acquired pursuant to federal conservation
programs 4' Nonetheless, states which permit negative, in gross
easements for conservation or preservation purposes utilize LUREs
to achieve a variety of public goals.42
The use of LUREs to protect or preserve environmentally sig-
nificant aspects of real property offers a number of advantages to
both the landowner and the easement holder. Foremost, LUREs
offer great flexibility. LURE agreements can be drafted with speci-
ficity regarding both the restricted and the allowed uses of the
land.43  The resulting capability of LUREs to accomplish either
conservation or preservation goals offers a tremendous advantage in
the protection of the diverse ecological aspects of our land re-
common law requirements and limitations on in gross benefits in real covenants, equitable
servitudes, and easements). Several state statutes use sirmilar language. See, e.g., N.Y.
ENVTL. CONsERV. LAW § 49-0305(5) (McKinney Supp. 1992) (mirroring UCEA validity
provisions for conservation easements); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.745 (1991) (same).
39. Atherton, supra note 34, at 62-63 (state conservation statutes vary in complexity
and precision since they are tailored to meet particular states' needs). Even among states
which substantially follow the UCEA, tailoring of the statute to meet the needs and goals
of each state has produced a variety of diverse provisions. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 55-
2107 (1988) (revising UCEA to prohibit creation of conservation easements through emi-
nent domain); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.850 (Baldwin 1989) (altering the UCEA to
add special provisions concerning mining); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 476 (West
1988) (deleting stated UCEA purposes regarding preservation of historical, architectural or
cultural aspects of real property and defining real property to include surface waters);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40 (West Supp. 1992) (supplementing the express purposes of
UCEA by adding the purpose to protect burial grounds).
40. See Atherton, supra note 34, at 62-67. In some cases, the divergent provisions of
state statutes yield diametrically opposed results. Compare IDAHO CODE § 55-2109 (1988)
(stating that conservation easements shall not affect assessed property value for tax pur-
poses) with IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2.6-7 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring assessed property
value to reflect the conservation easement for tax purposes).
41. See infra notes 455-64 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2.6-1 (West Supp. 1992) (containing a modified
list of the five policy purposes supported by the UCEA, including protection of natural
resources, enhancement of air and water quality, and protection of architectural, historical
and cultural aspects of real property).
43. See Hamilton, supra note 26, at 486 (noting that conservation easements can be
drafted to address land conditions and landowner needs).
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source.44 For example, while a wetland may need to be preserved
to maintain its environmentally significant functions, highly erod-
ible lands or forestlands may merely need to be conserved.5
Further, since less funds are required to purchase a LURE than
the full fee interest, the conservation purpose is accomplished more
efficiently.' Additionally, the management and possession of the
realty remain with the landowner.47 Because title remains with the
landowner, the realty remains subject to local property taxes, 4
although property value may be reduced by the presence of a
LURE.49 Moreover, property owners who donate LUREs may
qualify for a charitable deduction from federal income taxes.5"
44. Easements may be used to preserve the scenic or open-space values associated with
the land, as well as to regulate uses of the land which are permitted. See supra note 26;
see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 7, 11.02 (stating that conservation easements protect
open space, scenic views, wildlife habitats and outdoor recreation areas); R. Tim Willis,
The Use of Easements to Preserve Oregon Open Space, 12 WI.LAMETE LJ. 124, 125-26
(1975) (explaining that an easement allows the landowner to continue to use the land,
subject to the easement regulations).
45. The distinction between conservation and preservation should be noted, since these
terms describe two different approaches to environmental land management. Conservation
entails the use of science and technology to achieve efficient use of land resources. By
contrast, preservation emphasizes the aesthetics of the land as its most important feature.
Adherents of the latter view seek to preserve the land in its natural state, precluding any
commercial use, efficient or otherwise. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE
GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 189-198 (1959) (characterizing the conflict as between those who
favor resource development and those who argue that wildlife areas should be preserved
from commercial use); CURRENT ISSUES IN NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY 31 (Paul R.
Portney et al. eds., 1982) (stating that the scientific management espoused by the conser-
vationists conflicts with the objectives of preservationists who want lands left undisturbed).
For purposes of this article, the important point is that LUREs can be used to achieve
both conservation and preservation goals.
46. Hamilton, supra note 26, at 486. A LURE may not be cost effective if the device
fails to protect the resource adequately. Dana & Ramsey, supra note 26, at 10 n.45.
47. Hamilton, supra note 26, at 486.
48. Id. Because federally owned property is not subject to local taxes, local residents
shoulder an additional tax burden when the government protects land resources by acquir-
ing full fee title. See id.
49. See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 26, at 9 (noting that reduction in property value
due to LUREs may be offset by corresponding reduction in property taxes).
50. Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for donations of
real property interests which have significant environmental value and which are given
exclusively for conservation purposes. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), (h)(1)-(5) (1988) (de-
fining contributions which qualify for conservation deduction); see also Justin R. Ward &
F. Kaid Benfield, Conservation Easements: Prospects for Sustainable Agriculture, 8 VA.
ENVTL. L.J 271 (1989) (discussing the problem of conservation deductions where gifts of
"perpetual" easements are in fact of shorter duration); Thuothy J. Houseal, Note, Forever
a Farm: The Agricultural Conservation Easement in Pennsylvania, 94 DICK. L. REV. 527
(1990) (providing an in-depth analysis of the conservation deduction).
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For these and other reasons, LUREs have become the vehicle
of choice among private organizations for conservation and preser-
vation of the land resource.51 Private organizations engaged in
land acquisition include the National Trust for Historic Preserva-
tion, the Nature Conservancy, American Farmland Trust, Trust for
Public Land, and the Conservation Fund. These national organiza-
tions have protected nearly seven million acres of land.5 2 In addi-
tion, the number of local land trusts has dramatically increased. In
1950, there were fifty-three such organizations; in 1990, there were
899.53 Local land trusts have protected approximately 2.7 million
acres.' Similarly, state and local entities are increasingly relying
on easement acquisition programs as a means of protecting envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands.5
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal CouncilP6  may result in greater support
for LURE acquisition programs at the state level. Lucas indicates
that state regulation of land use may constitute a taking under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments unless the regulation is grounded
in the common law of nuisance.5 7 This decision may induce envi-
51. The federal tax code permits the establishment of charitable organizations for the
specific purpose of accepting donations of "qualified conservation contributions" as defined
in § 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. Regulations prescribe that a qualified organiza-
tion must satisfy the general requirements for tax exempt status, must have a commitment
to protect the conservation purposes of the donation, and must have the resources to
enforce the restriction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (1988) (defining eligible donee
requirements for conservation contribution).
52. Patricia P. Klintberg, The Great Land Grab, FARM JoURNAL, Dec. 1991, at 13
(1991).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally Myrl L. Duncan, Agriculture as a Resource: Statewide Land Use
Programs for the Preservation of Farmland, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401 (1987) (discussing
farmland protection prograns in states attempting to balance urban growth and agricultural
preservation); Grier, supra note 12 (surveying rise of land trusts and conservancies in
Michigan); Houseal, supra note 50 (discussing amendment to Pennsylvania's Agricultural
Security Act to provide revenue for conservation purposes).
The Indiana Heritage Trust Program, for example, authorizes the state Department of
Natural Resources to purchase real property or interests in real property. Property eligible
for the program is described as property that: "(1) is an example of outstanding natural
features and habitats; (2) has historical and archeological significance; and (3) provides
areas for conservation, recreation and the restoration of native biological diversity." Senate
Enrolled Act of 1992, No. 387, § 3(l)(a) (to be codified at IND. CODE § 14-3-20-1). The
program was enacted to ensure that Indiana's rich natural heritage is preserved or en-
hanced for succeeding generations. Id. § 1(b).
56. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
57. Id.; see infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
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ronmental interest groups to favor LUREs over lobbying for en-
hanced land use regulations.
Like the states, the federal government has had extensive in-
volvement in acquiring less-than-fee interests for conservation pur-
poses.- One of the oldest and most frequently used LURE programs
is the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 192958 ("MBCA"). The
MBCA was expanded in 1958 to permit the acquisition of interests
in small wetland or pothole areas such as waterfowl breeding habi-
tats. 9 The federal government has also used LUREs to protect
specific wildlife resources, 6° access to outdoor recreation, 6' and
scenic vistas along national highways.62
In particular, the 1990 Farm Bill has greatly expanded the
federal government's use of LUREs for conservation purposes. To
assist in understanding the flexibility of LUREs and their ready use
by the federal government to attain conservation goals, it will be
helpful to review the variety of LURE acquisition programs estab-
lished by federal agricultural legislation.
B. The Use of LUREs in Federal Agricultural Legislation
Recently, federal use of LUREs has been incorporated into
agricultural legislation to conserve and preserve farmland and
forestland. This legislation reflects societal awareness of the envi-
ronmentally significant and sensitive nature of wetlands and other
riparian areas, wildlife habitats, and windbreaks and shelterbelts,
predominantly found on lands which are or could be used for
agricultural purposes. As cropland is lost to urban development and
other uses, farmers must develop new croplands from natural lands,
often thereby destroying wetlands and other riparian areas as well
as other environmentally significant aspects of the land resource.
58. The MBCA authorizes the federal government to acquire areas of land and water
suitable for migratory waterfowl, or the "interests therein." 16 U.S.C. §§ 715a, 715d
(1988). The "interests" purchased by the federal government in such land are usually
LUREs.
59. Pub. L. No. 85-585, §§ 2-3, 72 Stat. 486, 487 (1958) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
718d(c) (1989)).
60. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 696, 698, 698f, 698n (1988) (authorizing various wildlife
and ecological preserves established by acquiring fee and easement interests).
61. See id. §§ 4601-4 to -11 (providing for state and federal acquisition of land and
water areas through Land and Water Conservation Fund to preserve quality and quantity
of outdoor recreation resources).
62. See 23 U.S.C. § 319 (1988). See generally Roger A. Cunningham, Scenic Ease-
ments in the Highway Beautification Program, 45 DEN. L.J. 167 (1968) (examining the
use of scenic easements to implement the Highway Beautification Program).
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Between 1954 and 1975, eighty-seven percent of the 13.8 million
wetland acres lost were converted to agricultural uses.63 Thus,
recent Congressional action protecting these environmentally sensi-
tive lands has come largely through agricultural legislation imple-
mented by the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
and its many agencies.64
1. The Early Use of LUREs for Conservation
The federal government first enacted conservation legislation to
combat soil erosion on agricultural lands during the Great Depres-
sion.65 However, early federal programs were limited because par-
ticipation was voluntary and their only benefits were technical
assistance and cost-sharing.56 Reluctant to impose direct controls
on privately owned land, Congress worked in partnership with the
agricultural community to maintain the voluntary aspect of conser-
vation legislation. The use of LUREs in federal conservation pro-
grams continues this cooperative approach. Since LUREs provide
flexibility to accommodate diverse circumstances, they provide
Congress with the ability to broaden federal conservation programs
and increase the incentives for participation.
Congress began using LUREs in a 1973 agricultural program,
the Rural Environmental Conservation Program ("RECP"). 67 As
originally enacted, the RECP authorized the Secretary of the USDA
63. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRULTUR, AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6 (1991). In
addition to the need for new cropland to offset the encroachment of urban areas, some
farm policies encourage farmers to increase production needlessly. See B.J. Wynne III &
Carol A. Bradley, Is the 1990 Farm Bill the Opening Shot in a "Quiet Revolution?', 44
Sw. Li. 1383, 1390 (1991) (arguing that the deficiency payment program encourages
higher production to maximize eligibility for program benefits regardless of market de-
mand).
64. These agencies include the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
("ASCS"), the Extension Service (ES"), the Forest Service ("FS"), the Soil Conservation
Service ("SCS"), and the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA"). U.S. DEP'T OF AGRI-
CULTURE, AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 37 (1991).
65. Soil erosion threatens agricultural productivity. In the early 1930s, when a great
extent of society was agrarian, soil erosion caused by droughts contributed to economic
depression and the problem of high unemployment. Linda A. Malone, The Renewed Con-
cern Over Soil Erosion: The Current Federal Programs and Proposals, 10 J. AGRIC.
TAX'N & L. 310, 317 (1988).
66. Id. at 318; Linda A. Malone, A Historical Essay on the Conservation Provisions of
the 1985 Farm Bill: Sodbusting, Swampbusting, and the Conservation Reserve, 34 KAN.
L. REV. 577, 579 (1986).
67. See Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, §§
1001-1010, 87 Stat. 221, 241-46 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1510 (1988
& Supp. HI 1990)).
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("Secretary") to purchase perpetual LUREs for soil conservation or
wetlands preservation, as well as to promote sound use and man-
agement of flood plains, shorelands, and aquatic areas of the na-
tion." The 1985 Farm Bill 'amended the RECP by replacing the
provision requiring perpetual LUREs and authorizing LUREs "for a
term of not less than 50 years."
69
The 1985 Farm Bill also initiated an innovative use of LUREs
in conjunction with farm debt restructuring. 0 The bill authorized
the Secretary to acquire and retain LUREs on certain lands, for a
term of not less than fifty years, as a means of debt restructuring
on Farmers Home Association ("FmHA") loans made before De-
cember 23, 1985.1 In addition, to promote conservation purposes
the bill authorized the FmHA to grant- or sell LUREs held on
farmland to a unit of state or local government or to a private
nonprofit organization. n Besides allowing LUREs to protect farm-
land, this provision is distinctive because it permits the federal
government to transfer LUREs to local governments or private
third parties. 73
Although other conservation programs initiated in the 1985
68. Id. § 1001, 87 Stat. at 241-42, amended by Food Security Act of 1985, §
1318(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354, 1531.
69. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, sec. 1318(b)(2), § 1001, 99 Stat.
1354, 1531 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988)).
70. The debt restructuring program was touted as allowing the farmer to stay on the
farm while promoting conservation goals. See, e.g., Preparation for the 1990 Farm Bill:
Hearings on Conservation Issues and Agricultural Practices and Oversight on the Forestry
Title of the 1990 Farm Bill Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Forestry of the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 427
(1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Robert W. Kasten, Jr.).
71. 7 U.S.C. § 1997(b) (1988). The easement-for-debt restructuring is in the form of a
"write-down" which reduces the borrower's debt. Farmer Programs Account Servicing
Policies, 7 C.F.R. § 1951.906(c)(6) (1992). The debt restructuring program requires that:
(1) the land must be either uplands, wetlands, or highly erodible lands; (2) the realty
must be secured by an FmHA loan held by the Secretary and the borrower must have
been unable to repay the loan in a timely manner, or (3) the realty must have been ad-
ministered by the Secretary under the conservation title; and (4) the realty must have been
row cropped for each of the three years preceding the bill's date of enactment (except in
the case of wetlands or wildlife habitats). 7 U.S.C. § 1997(c) (Supp. I 1990). The 1985
Farm Bill was approved on December 23, 1985. 99 Stat. at 1660.
72. 7 U.S.C. § 1985(c)(1) (Supp. II 1990) (authorizing conveyance of "an easement,
restriction, development rights, or the equivalent" held by the United States in certain
farmland). Farmland in Fm-A's inventory becomes eligible for sale to the public only
when: (1) the Secretary has determined that the land is unsuitable for sale to persons who
qualify for assistance under other farm programs; or, (2) no qualified person has pur-
chased the land within twelve months after the land was first made available. Id.
73. Id.
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Farm Bill were proving to be effective, conservationists and other
interest groups were dissatisfied with the implementation of the
FmIHA LURE provisions. During Congressional proceedings on the
1990 Farm Bill, frequent calls were made to strengthen these pro-
visions.74 Witnesses pointed out that the debt-for-easement pro-
gram had been used by the FmHA in fewer than five cases, even
though the FmHA had forgiven more than 1.8 billion dollars of
debt owed by approximately 9,600 borrowers.75 Furthermore, it
was noted that the FmIHA had acquired LUREs on less than 200 of
the more than 1,200 properties recommended for easement pro-
grams by the Fish and Wildlife Service.76
Following enactment of the 1985 Farm Bill, there was a grow-
ing recognition of LUREs as an ideal means to conserve or pre-
serve environmentally sensitive lands. Much of the testimony on
the conservation provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill supported greater
use of LUREs by the federal government. The following passage is
representative of statements made during congressional hearings:
Greater attention needs to be given to using conservation
easements to build a lasting conservation legacy. Conser-
vation easements are a valuable tool for protecting
wetlands, forest lands, or other environmentally sensitive
lands in perpetuity. In designing authority for acquiring
easements, opportunities to develop cooperative partnerships
with states, such as establishing federal/state matching re-
quirements for funding, should be considered.'
Congress heard the message. While the 1990 Farm Bill largely
74. Witnesses asserted that the 1985 Farm Bill, and Presidential orders directing federal
agencies to minimize destruction of wetlands, required the federal government to place
LUREs on properties in FmHA inventories before those properties were resold, leased or
transferred. See, e.g., Formulation of the 1990 Farm Bill: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Conservation, Credit, and Rural Development, House Comm. on Agriculture, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt XIII at 127 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Eric
W. Schenck); see also Exec. Order No. 11,988, 3 C.F.R. § 117 (1977) (as amended by
Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 C.F.RL § 412 (1979)); Exec. Order No. 11,990, 3 C.F.R. §
121 (1972) (as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,608, 3 C.F.R. § 245 (1987)).
75. House Hearings, supra note 74, at 127 (statement of Eric W. Schenck).
76. Id. In using his authority to acquire LUREs, the Secretary must consult the Fish
and Wildlife Service in selecting eligible property, formulating the terms of LUREs, and
enforcing the agreements. 7 U.S.C. § 1997(f) (1988). Critics of FmHA's efforts also
charged that only 25,000 acres of land had been placed under permanent easements, when
the program could have been used to protect over 500,000 acres of wetlands in FmHA's
inventory. Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 610 (statement of Peter A. Berle).
77. House Hearings, supra note 74, at 123 (statement of Eric W. Schenck).
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reiterates policies in the 1985 Farm Bill,78 the 1990 legislation
greatly expanded the use of LUREs for conservation purposes. In
addition, the 1990 Farm Bill expanded the types of land which
federal LUREs may protect.
2. LURE Provisions in the 1990 Farm Bill
The LURE programs in the 1990 Farm Bill incorporate a num-
ber of common features. In general, the programs are available to
eligible owners or operators of land with specific characteristics.
Participants must agree to implement conservation or preservation
measures in accord with approved plans. 79 The incentive for par-
ticipation is usually a combination of cash payments and cost-shar-
ing of conservation or restoration measures.s' The cash payments
may not exceed the difference in value between the unencumbered
land and the land encumbered by the LURE.81 Payments are gen-
erally disbursed in five to twenty annual installments.8 2 Character-
istics of the protected resource and variations in the LURE provi-
sions distinguish the programs from each other.
a. The FmHA Provisions
The 1990 Farm Bill extends and broadens the provisions autho-
rizing the FmHA to acquire LUREs in return for debt-restructur-
ing. 3 LUREs may now be acquired before the farmer actually
defaults on an FmHA loan." The provision may be used if the
exchange of an easement "better enables a qualified borrower to
repay the loan in a timely manner."8 5 In addition, the pre-Decem-
78. David S. Cloud, Senate 'Prairie Populists' Lose As Panel Approves Farm Bill,
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., June 23, 1990, at 1953 (quoting Sen. Richard G. Lugar).
79. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(b) (Supp. II 1990) (describing requirements for
wetland easement conservation plans under the Wetlands Reserve Program). The Wetlands
Reserve Program requires effective restoration of wetlands through the use of inspections,
improvements and repairs. Id. § 3837a(b)(1). The program prohibits the alteration of wild-
life habitats or other features of the land, unless specifically authorized by the conserva-
tion plan. Id. § 3837a(b)(2). However, the land may be used for certain "compatible eco-
nomic uses" consistent with the long-term protection of the wetland resource. Id. §
3837a(d). These uses include hunting and fishing, managed timber harvest, and periodic
haying or grazing. Id.
80. See, e.g., id. §§ 3837a(f), 3837c(a)-(b) (describing compensation to owners and
duties of the Secretary regarding cost-sharing and technical assistance).
81. E.g., id §§ 3837a(f), 3839b(2)(B).
82. E.g., id § 3837a(f).
83. See 7 U.S.C. § 1997 (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
84. See 7 U.S.C. § 1997(c)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. H1 1990).
85. Id.
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ber 23, 1985, loan requirement was removed, allowing restructuring
on all qualified loans." The regulations prescribe that LUREs ob-
tained through restructuring must be for periods of not less than
fifty years; however, the LUREs may be longer or perpetual if
justified." Unfortunately, though, the 1990 Farm Bill did not re-
solve the noted failure of the FnHA to use LUREs as a means of
debt restructuring. 8
The 1990 Farm Bill did add a section requiring the FmHA to
establish perpetual LUREs on wetlands in inventoried property. 9
However, the provisions are carefully crafted to limit adverse im-
pacts on the marketability of productive cropland.9° In particular,
the statute limits the placement of LUREs to ensure that the prop-
erty continues as the same basic enterprise when sold or leased
to qualified individuals.' Maintaining the voluntary aspect of ag-
ricultural conservation measures, this section requires the FmHA to
notify borrowers considering easement-for-debt restructuring in
writing that a LURE may be placed on their land.93
b. The Agricultural Resource Conservation Program
The 1990 Farm Bill also significantly expanded the Conserva-
tion Reserve subchapter, renaming it the Agricultural Resources
Conservation Program.' As amended, two programs incorporate
86. Id. § 1997(c)(3)(A)(i). In a case involving a new loan which is not delinquent, the
Secretary may treat up to 33 percent of the loan principal as prepaid in exchange for the
grant of an easement. Id. § 1997(e)(1), (2)(B). In the case of new loan which is delin-
quent, the Secretary may only reduce the debt by the value of the land on which the
easement is acquired, or the difference between the amount of the outstanding loan and
the value of the land, whichever is greater. Id. § 1997(e)(1), (2)(A).
87. Farmer Programs Account Servicing Policies, 7 C.F.R. pt. 1951, subpt. S, exhibit
H, § VI (1992). Justifications for perpetual LUREs include: a contribution to the protec-
tion of wildlife habitats; the protection of a significant historical site or groundwater re-
charge area; a benefit from removing the acreage from production; or the provision of a
substantial investment of public funds to achieve conservation goals. Id. § VI(B), (E)-(F).
88. Current regulations leave the option of using LUREs as a means of debt restructur-
ing to the farmer;, the FmHA will act only if a borrower's application for loan servicing
includes a specific request for the debt-for-easement option. Farmer Programs Account
Servicing Policies, 7 C.F.R. § 1951.909(a) (1991).
89. 7 U.S.C. § 1985(g)(1) (Supp. 11 1990).
90. Id. § 1985(g)(2).
91. The phrase -same basic enterprise7 was explained as follows: The Senate did not
intend for the circumstance to arise where the amount and location of easements estab-
lished on .. . a cotton or dairy farm acquired by the FmIHA would prevent the property
from being marketed as a cotton or dairy farm." ILR. CONF. REP. No. 916, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1126 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5286, 5651.
92. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1985(e)(1)(C)(ii), (g)(5)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. U 1990).
93. Id. § 1985(g)(6).
94. See 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 1431, 104 Stat. 3359, 3576-77,
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LUREs: (i) the Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Pro-
gram, which expands the Conservation Reserve Program and cre-
ates the Wetlands Reserve Program; and (ii) the Environmental
Easement Program.95
(i) The Conservation Reserve Conversions
The 1985 Farm Bill established the Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram ("CRP") authorizing the Secretary to enter into installment
contracts to retire 45 million acres of erosive cropland from pro-
duction for ten year periods.96 Mindful of the need to continue
conservation of lands enrolled in the CRP beyond the initial terms
of CRP contracts, Congress amended the CRP to encourage farmers
to convert the lands to other conserving uses. An owner or opera-
tor enrolled in the CRP under a contract in effect on November
28, 1990, may extend the contract to a maximum term of fifteen
years97 if vegetative cover areas are devoted to hardwood trees,
windbreaks, shelterbelts, or wildlife corridors. 9
In addition, a qualified owner or operator may transfer into the
Wetlands Reserve Program ("WRP") by restoring to wetlands areas
of highly erodible cropland currently devoted to vegetative cov-
er.99 This conversion is conditioned on the owner's grant of a
long-term or perpetual LURE to the Secretary." ° The incentive
of extended monetary payments to farmers under the new CRP
provisions should readily increase the federal government's acquisi-
tion of LUREs.
(ii) The Wetlands Reserve Program
The WRP directs the Secretary to attempt to enroll one million
amended by Act of July 22, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-234, 106 Stat. 447 (to be codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 3831(b)(4)(C), 3835a(a)(2)).
95. See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3830-3839d (West Supp. 1992), amended by Act of July 22,
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-234, 106 Stat. 447.
96. 16 U.S.C. § 3831 (Supp. H 1990), amended by Act of July 22, 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-324, § 1(a), 106 Stat. 447, 447,
97. Act of July 22, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-234, § l(b)(l), 106 Stat. 447, 447 (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3835a(a)(2)(A)). The contract may only be extended if the origi-
nal term of the contract was less than 15 years. Id.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 3835a(a)(1) (Supp. H 1990).
99. Id. § 3835a(b). The Secretary must permit the conversion if (1) the areas are prior
converted wetlands, (2) there is a high probability that the area can be successfully re-
stored to wetland status, and (3) the restoration otherwise meets the requirements of the
WRP. Id. § 3835a(b)(1), (3)-(4). The Secretary may terminate or modify a CRP contract
if the land subject to the contract is transferred to the WRP. Id. § 3837(0.
100. Id. § 3835a(b)(2).
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acres of eligible land into the program by the end of the 1995
calendar year.0 Land is eligible if it is determined to be a
farmed wetland, or a wetland converted after December 23,
1985,1" and if the "likelihood of the successful restoration...
and the resultant wetland values merit inclusion of such land in the
program taking into consideration the cost of such restoration."1"
To participate in the WRP, the owner of the eligible land must
grant a long-term or perpetual LURE to the Secretary. The Secre-
tary is directed to give priority to obtaining perpetual LUREs over
those for shorter terms. 4 Perpetual LUREs qualify for cost-shar-
ing of between seventy-five and one hundred percent of the eligi-
ble costs; otherwise, the government share is limited to between
fifty and seventy-five percent of the eligible costs.1" Further, a
lump-sum payment is permitted only if a perpetual LURE is ac-
quired.'06 The WRP thus encourages the acquisition of LUREs,
particularly perpetual LUREs,1°7 to protect wetlands."~
(iii) The Environmental Easement Program
The Environmental Easement Program ("EEP") directs the
Secretary to acquire LUREs "in order to ensure the continued long-
term protection of environmentally sensitive lands or reduction in
101. Id. § 3837(b). Lands are enrolled in the WRP through the acquisition of a LURE
by the Secretary. Id. § 3837(g).
102. Id. § 3837(c)(1).
103. Id. § 3837(c)(2). The Secretary may also, include in the WRP:
(1) farmed wetland and adjoining lands, enrolled in the conservation reserve,
with the highest wetland functions and values, and that are likely to return to
production after they leave the conservation reserve; (2) other wetland of an
owner that would not otherwise be eligible if the Secretary determines that the
inclusion of such wetland in such easement would significantly add to the
functional value of the easement; and (3) riparian areas that link wetlands that
are protected by easements or some other device or circumstance that achieves
the same purpose as an easement.
16 U.S.C.A. § 3837(d) (West Supp. 1992).
104. Id. § 3837c(d).
105. Id. § 3837c(b).
106. Otherwise, the compensation may be paid in five to twenty annual installments. Id.
§ 3837a(f).
107. However, a sale of a LURE may be taxed as a capital gain. See LR.C. § 1222(3)
(1988). Thus, income tax consequences of a lump sum payment may influence grants of
perpetual LUREs.
108. The Secretary has additional authority to purchase wetlands or interests in wetlands
through the Wetlands Resources Chapter: 16 U.S.C. § 3922 (1988). The authorization per-
mits the Secretary to acquire wetlands not protected under the Migratory Bird and Conser-
vation Act and requires purchases to be consistent with the wetlands priority plan. Id §
3921.
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the degradation of water quality" on eligible farms or ranches. 9
The LUREs must be either perpetual or for the maximum duration
permitted by state law."' Eligible lands include lands in the
CRP,11' lands covered by the Water Bank Act,"' croplands
containing riparian corridors, environmentally sensitive areas, or
critical wildlife habitats.11 3 To participate in the EEP, in addition
to granting a LURE to the Secretary, a landowner must also agree
to implement a natural resource conservation management plan." 4
However, the landowner may use the land for recreational activities
such as hunting and fishing."' The EEP thus significantly ex-
pands the categories of land which may be protected by LUREs.
c. The Farms for the Future Act
The Farms for the Future Act ("Farms Act") promotes preser-
vation of farmland resources on a national basis."6 The legisla-
tion authorizes the Secretary, through the FmHA, to establish the
Agricultural Resource Conservation Demonstration Program to
provide federal guarantee and interest rate assistance for eligible
loans to state trust funds." 7 The regulations utilize LUREs to
achieve the program goals. The interim rule provides that guaran-
teed loans can be used to purchase "development rights easements,
conservation easements,. . . and farmland in fee simple,"" 8 and
109. 16 U.S.C. § 3839(a) (Supp. n1 1990).
110. Id.
111. However, if the CRP land is likely to remain out of production and does not pose
an off-fam environmental threat, the land is not eligible. Id. § 3839(b)(1). Further, if
CRP land contains timber stands or pasture land converted to trees the land is also ineli-
gible. Id. § 3839(b)(2).
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311 (1988).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 3839(b)(l)(A)-(C) (Supp. II 1990).
114. Id. § 3839a(a)(1). In addition, landowners are required to make appropriate deed
restrictions, obtain written consent from holders of security interests, produce commodities
which benefit wildlife, and refrain from grazing or harvesting practices which defeat the
purpose of the easement. Id. § 3839a(a)(2)(A)-(B), (E)-(G).
115. Id. § 3839b(4). The Secretary is authorized to pay up to 100% of the cost of
establishing conservation measures under this program. Id. § 3839c(b).
116. 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 1465(b), 104 Stat. 3359, 3616, amended
by Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-237, sec. 203, § 1465(b), 105 Stat. 1818, 1848, reprinted in 7 U.S.C.A. § 4201 note
(West Supp. 1992).
117. Id. § 1466(a). Eligibility requirements dictate, among other things, that a state must
operate or administer a land preservation fund and assist local governing bodies or private
nonprofit or public organizations in carrying out preservation measures. Id. § 1465(c)(3).
118. 57 Fed. Reg. 4336, 4338 (1992) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1980.910(a)(1)).
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notes that the Secretary intends all LUREs to be perpetual. 119
Borrowers are required to prepare a State Farmland Preservation
Plan"ro which must include a detailed description of the restric-
tions to be imposed by any easements.' Further, the borrower
must then demonstrate the legal authority necessary to comply with
provisions of the plan.1' An important distinction from other us-
es of LUREs in the Conservation Title of the 1990 Farm Bill is
that LUREs acquired under the Farms Act are purchased and held
by the states through their trust funds rather than by the federal
government. 1
d. The Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Program
The Watershed Protection Program ("Watershed program") was
created in 1954 to protect and improve the nation's land and water
resources124 Like the CRP, the program authorizes the Secretary
to enter into agreements with landowners based on conservation
plans carried out over ten year periods in return for cost-sharing by
the federal government.125 The 1990 Farm Bill expanded the Wa-
tershed program by authorizing cost-sharing for perpetual LUREs
on wetlands or floodplains to perpetuate, restore, and enhance the
natural capabilities of land and water resources. 126 Eligible project
sponsors include state and local agencies, soil and water conserva-
tion districts, approved nonprofit irrigation and reservoir companies,
and water users' associations. 2 Thus, like the Farms Act,
LUREs' acquired under this program are held by state or private
nonprofit entities rather than by the federal government.
e. The Forest Legacy Program
The 1990 Farm Bill includes the Forest Stewardship Act, 28
119. Id. (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1980.918(a)(4)).
120. Id. (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1980.918).
121. Id. (to be codified at 7 C.F.1. § 1980.918(a)(2)).
122. Id. at 4339 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1980.921(b)).
123. See 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 1465(c)(2), 104 Stat. 3359, 3616,
amended by Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act Amendments of 1991, Pub.
L No. 102-237, sec. 203, § 1465(c)(2), 105 Stat. 1818, 1848, reprinted in 7 U.S.C.A. §
4201 note (West Supp. 1992) (describing eligibility requirements for loans to states, in-
cluding protection of farmland).
124. Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, Pub. L No. 83-566, § 1, 68 Stat.
666, 666 (1954) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1003(6) (Supp. H 1990).
126. Id. § 1003a(a). The Secretary must require project sponsors to provide up to 50%
of the cost of acquiring the LURE. Id. § 1003a(b).
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1002 (1988 & Supp. n 1990).
128. 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L. No. 101-624, §§ 1201-1224, 104 Stat. 3359, 3521-3542
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
authorizing the Secretary to cooperate with state forestry officials,
nongovernmental organizations and the private sector in implement-
ing federal programs affecting non-federal forestland.' 9 One such
program is the Forest Legacy Program ("FLP").'o The FLP au-
thorizes the Secretary, in cooperation with appropriate state and
local governments,' to acquire LUREs or full fee interests132
to protect environmentally important forest areas, riparian areas,
and other ecological resources.'
3
Criteria for priority lands eligible for the FLP are established
by the Secretary together with state advisory committees, subject to
the purposes of the FLP."" However, where a state has not ap-
proved the acquisition of land under section 515 of title 16,135
the FLP is necessarily limited to those lands within the state which
have been approved for inclusion."s While the FLP is coopera-
tively established, title to the LUREs acquired under the program
must be held exclusively by the federal government. 37  Further-
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2114 (Supp. H 1990)) (amending the Cooperative Forestry
Assistance Act of 1978).
129. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2114 (1988 & Supp. H 1990) (detailing various programs
in the Forest Stewardship Act). The 1990 Farm Bill also established the Forest Steward-
ship Program to bring 25 million acres of private forestland under voluntary management.
16 U.S.C. § 2103a(b) (Supp. II 1990). The Stewardship Incentives Program achieves the
goal of encouraging stewardship by providing technical information and assistance. Id. §
2103b.
130. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2103c (West Supp. 1992).
131. The FLP requires the Secretary to cooperate with state, regional and other appro-
priate units of government. Id. § 2103c(a). The Secretary is also expected to coordinate
with state or regional programs deemed consistent with the FLP. Id. § 2103c(b).
132. Id. § 2103c(c).
133. See id. § 2103c(a). The LUREs must require the landowner to engage in sound
forest management practices, consistent with the purposes for which the land was entered
in the FLP. Id. § 2103c(i). Although the LURE may permit hunting, fishing, and recre-
ational uses on the protected land, the landowner is precluded from converting the prop-
erty to other uses. Id. The Secretary must pay the fair market value of the LURE to the
landowner and may require cost-sharing of up to 75%. Id. § 2103cj).
134. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2103c(e) (West Supp. 1992). The committees are directed to consult
with other agriculture and forestry committees and recommend priority lands for inclusion
in the FLP. 16 U.S.C. § 2113(b)(2)(A), (D) (Supp. H1 1990). Owners of eligible land may
submit applications as prescribed by the Secretary. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2103c(f) (West Supp.
1992).
135. Section 515 directs the Secretary to locate and purchase "forested, cut-over, or
denuded lands within the watersheds of navigable streams" if necessary to regulate the
flow of navigable streams or for the production of timber. 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1988). Pur-
chases under § 515 must be approved by the legislature of the state where the land lies.
Id.
136. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(g) (Supp. H 1990).
137. Id. § 2103c(c).
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more, the FLP requires LUREs held under the program to be per-
petual, despite state law limits on duration.
1 38
In sum, the 1985 Farm Bill instituted the use of LUREs as an
innovative conservation device.139 The 1990 Farm Bill has greatly
expanded the use of LUREs in federal conservation programs."4
Originally viewed primarily as a means to protect wetlands, LUREs
are now commonly employed throughout conservation programs to
protect such diverse resources as farmland, forestland, windbreaks
and shelterbelts.141 In addition, farmers have indicated a willing-
ness to work with the federal government to achieve conservation
goals through voluntary land acquisition programs. 42 In the fu-
ture, the use of LUREs may become an even more important fea-
ture of federal agricultural policies. However, due to the impor-
tance of our agricultural economy, and the impact of this economy
on federal conservation goals, LUREs must be used in an efficient
and effective manner.
II. ARE LURE AcQUsrnoN PROGRAMS AN APPROPRIATE
FEDERAL MEANS TO ATrAIN CONSERVATION GoALS?
The greatly expanded use of LURE acquisition programs in the
1990 Farm Bill demonstrates the political acceptability of using
LUREs as an incentive to achieve conservation and preservation
goals. However, some commentators argue that the government
should directly regulate the use of environmentally sensitive lands
138. Id. § 2103(k)(2). The provision states in full:
Notwithstanding any provision of State law, no conservation easement held by
the United States or its successors or assigns under this section shall be limited
in duration or scope or be defeasible by -
(A) the conservation easement being in gross or appurtenant;
(B) the management of the conservation easement having been dele-
gated or assigned to a non-Federal entity;
(C) any requirement under State law for re-recordation or renewal of
the easement; or
(D) any future disestablishment of a Forest Legacy Program area or
other Federal project for which the conservation easement was originally ac-
quired.
Id. Section 2103c(d)(1) specifies.that easements acquired under the program may be held
in perpetuity.
139. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 79-138 and accompanying text.
141. Many other types of land are also protected by LUREs under current federal land
acquisition programs, including riparian areas, highly erodible lands, and wildlife corridors.
See supra notes 99, 103, 113, 133 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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rather than rely on voluntary agreements which impose conserva-
tion costs on the government.1 43 Therefore, before addressing how
to use LUREs most effectively, it is important to justify LURE
acquisition programs as the most appropriate means for conserving
and preserving environmentally important land resources located
largely on lands which are or could be used for agricultural pur-
poses. This section explores some of the constitutional and eco-
nomic considerations surrounding the alternative of direct regulation
of land uses.
A. Regulation versus Incentives
Constitutional authority for federal environmental regulations
generally derives from the Commerce Clause, which empowers
Congress to "regulate Commerce ... among the several
states." 144 In addition to the regulation of interstate activities, the
broad interpretation of the commerce power in conjunction with the
Necessary and Proper Clause 145 permits Congress to regulate in-
trastate activities if the impact of the regulation is the effectuation
of commerce policies. For example, under the Commerce Clause,
Congress generally cannot regulate a manufacturing process itself
because it is not interstate commerce.' Yet labor conditions in
manufacturing plants can be regulated if the particular regulation is
a necessary and proper means of effectuating some congressional
policy relating to interstate commerce." Thus, even though the
143. See, e.g., William L. Church, Farmland Conversion: The View From 1986, 1986
U. ILL. L REV. 521, 544 (noting the high costs of incentives as a means to preserve
agricultural land); Steven L. Dickerson, The Evolving Federal Wetland Program, 44 Sw.
LJ. 1473, 1497 (1991) (advocating federal programs in which wetlands would be pur-
chased directly through public financing); Renee Stone, Wetlands Protection and Develop-
ment: The Advantage of Retaining Federal Control, 10 STAN. ENvTL. L. J. 137, 166
(1991) (opposing delegation to the states of federal regulatory control over wetlands and
arguing in favor of an improved federal regulatory scheme).
144. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
146. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1895) (holding that
suppression of monopoly in sugar manufacture is unconstitutional where monopoly does
not implicate interstate commerce); cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396-
98 (1905) (allowing Congress to suppress an agreement primarily affecting trade within a
state because the secondary effects on interstate commerce were not remote or accidental).
147. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1937) (up-
holding regulation of intrastate labor relations as a necessary and proper means to protect
interstate commerce from industrial strife). Although it is often stated that Congress may
regulate an activity which "affects commerce," that is an inaccurate statement of the con-
stitutional requirement. Congressional regulation of intrastate activity must advance an
interstate commercial goal. While these same regulations may simultaneously further other,
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production of agricultural products may be solely an intrastate
activity, Congress may constitutionally regulate certain aspects of
agricultural production if the regulation promotes interstate com-
merce policies."
Further, under the Commerce Clause, the federal government
may regulate to achieve extraneous ends which accomplish objec-
tives not specifically entrusted to the federal government. 149 By
employing a means within the scope of the commerce power, Con-
gress may influence affairs beyond the scope of its enumerated
powers and traditionally within the domain of the states.
Accordingly, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
regulate activities causing air pollution, water pollution, and other
environmental hazards to promote the general welfare, so long as
the impact of the regulation promotes interstate commerce policies.
For instance, congressional activities which may be upheld include:
regulation of pollution that has effects in more than one state;
regulations that protect or preserve the quality of waters used for
navigation, industry or irrigation; regulations that protect waters
which attract interstate travelers for recreational or scientific pur-
poses or which attract migratory birds; or regulations that protect
habitats for endangered wildlife species which draw interstate trav-
elers.15
non-commercial goals, the presence of an interstate commercial purpose is constitutionally
required. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 103 (1941) (indicating the commerce
power is measured by what it regulates, not by what it affects); see also David E.
Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51, 59-61 (1973)
(regulating labor conditions is permissible if it is a necessary and proper means of con-
trolling interstate commerce); David F. Engdahl, Some Observations on State and Federal
Control of Natural Resources, 15 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (1978) (Congress may regu-
late intrastate activities only when the purpose of the regulation is to effectuate an inter-
state commercial policy).
148. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (upholding regulation
of wheat grown for personal consumption given the cumulative effect of private wheat
production on interstate commerce).
149. The Supreme Court recognized that this type of legislation was constitutional in
Darby, 312 U.S. at 114-17. In Darby, the Court held that even if Congress had enacted
federal labor standards to address purely humanitarian ends, the legislation was nonetheless
within the scope of the Commerce Clause because the means - a prohibition on ship-
ment in interstate commerce of products manufactured under wage and hour conditions
failing to meet statutory standards - was a regulation of commerce. Id. at 103. The
Court deemed the regulation "indubitably a regulation of commerce" and held that regu-
lations of commerce, whatever their motive and purpose, are within the plenary power
conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. Id. at 113, 115.
150. See, e.g., Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that dis-
charge of dredge or fill material into Utah lake could have substantial economic effects
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Congress could use the commerce power to protect environ-
mentally significant lands currently protected by the use of LUREs.
Among other functions, wetlands perform an important role in the
ecosystem by purifying waters flowing into aquifers which are
frequently tapped for irrigation purposes.' 1 Agricultural activities
which affect wetlands could therefore be regulated. Similarly, activ-
ities which erode farmland or deplete private forestland could be
regulated due to their adverse effect on our nation's ability to meet
its food and timber needs. 52 Further, other riparian areas, wildlife
corridors, windbreaks, and shelterbelts at least indirectly affect
interstate commerce by virtue of their role in maintaining the bal-
ance of the ecosystems which generate marketable commodities and
thus interstate movement. 53  Although more tenuously related,
regulation of agricultural activities affecting such lands may simi-
larly be within the scope of the Commerce Clause used in conjunc-
tion with the Necessary and Proper Clause."5
To date, however, Congress has elected to regulate directly
on interstate commerce, including preventing travelers from observing animal life); United
States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325-26 (6th Cir. 1974) (noting
interstate effects of pollution in navigable streams); United States v. Bishop Processing
Co., 287 F. Supp. 624, 629-32 (D. Md. 1968) (upholding congressional regulation of air
pollution under commerce clause power), aft'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 904 (1970).
151. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 3901(a)(5) (West Supp. 1992) (wetlands enhance water quality
and water supply by serving as ground water recharge areas, nutrient traps, and .chemical
sinks).
152. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981) (preservation of prime farmland is
a federal interest that may rationally be addressed through the Commerce Clause); see
also Margaret R. Grossman, Prime Farmland and the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act: Guidance for an Enhanced Federal Role in Farmland Preservation, 33
DRAKE L. REV. 209 (1983-84) (discussing role of federal government in preserving farm-
land).
153. Cf. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 994-
95 (D. Haw. 1979), af'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding endangered species of
fish, wildlife and plants to have national aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recre-
ational, and scientific value; programs which protect and improve these resources or their
habitats preserve the possibilities of interstate movement of persons who come to observe
or enjoy them). See also George C. Coggins & William H. Hensley, Constitutional Limits
on Federal Power to Protect and Manage Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species Act Endan-
gered?, 61 IoWA L. REV. 1099, 1147 (1976) (Congress may regulate interstate, trade in a
particular species under the Commerce Clause).
154. The Necessary and Proper Clause may be exercised to attain an extraneous end as
long as the means used bear some relation to the effectuation of an enumerated power.
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (up-
holding congressional prohibition against racial discrimination in local motels as a neces-
sary and proper means of preventing harmful effects on interstate commerce).
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only those agricultural practices involving the application of inputs,
such as pesticides and other agrichemicals, which are more readily
perceived as being potentially harmful."' 5 The basis for Congress'
reluctance to regulate directly is at least threefold: Congress prefers
to work in partnership with the agricultural industry; direct regula-
tion of agricultural uses of land is more readily subject to challeng-
es under the Fifth Amendment; and unique characteristics of the
agricultural industry prevent society from absorbing its share of
costs associated with regulation.
1. The Tension Between Private Ownership and Societal Rights
Although Congress has expressly recognized the need to con-
serve environmentally important land resources and "to assure their
management in the public interest for this and future genera-
tions," 15  Congress has .declined to regulate directly against
farmers' individual land use decisions. This restraint in federal
regulation conflicts with the federal government's growing aware-
ness of the public interest - or social rights - in privately held
land. Social rights are those rights possessed by communities at
large. Communities are generally more concerned about the rights
of future generations than are individual persons. Therefore, as
Professor Lynton Caldwell has noted, concerns for social rights in
environmentally important land look to the future, and require
managed land use to preserve for the future, rather than for the
highest and best use of the land for the present.5 7
In large part, the reluctance to impose direct regulations on
private land use stems from the common law concept of private
ownership. Land use laws today, and the rights and obligations of
landowners, are based on inherited values and beliefs. For over
three hundred years, American culture has strongly linked owner-
ship of real property with individual freedom.15 The traditional
155. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-
136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
156. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3901(a)(9) (West Supp. 1992).
157. Lynton K. Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 319, 323 (1986); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic
Trees: New Foundations in Environmental Law, 83 YALE L3. 1315, 1327 & n.58 (1974)
(stating that effective environmental policy can be shaped only through shared experiences
and understandings which foster communal goals).
158. Caldwell, supra note 157, at 320;, see J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE AND
HISTORY 103 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1985) (finding that in the Western tradition prop-
erty has been a means by which citizens achieve autonomy); see also JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 129-30 (1988) (stating that many writers have suggest-
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notion of private ownership permits the landowner to use the land
as she pleases, so long as her use does not unreasonably affect
another's enjoyment of her land. This notion of land ownership
entails "no obligation for stewardship on behalf of the general
society." 159 Landowners thus claim a right to use, deplete, and
even destroy their land to achieve short-term gain. 60
The tension between traditional aspects of private ownership
and societal rights in private land is central to most contemporary
land use issues. 161 As Professor Caldwell has aptly stated: "Peo-
ple committed to an ethic of... ecological sustainability continue
to collide with those who make land use decisions upon a very
different ethic, an ethic that regards economic development and
monetary return as evidence of the land's highest and best
use."' 62 For better or worse, the traditional notion of private own-
ership is firmly ingrained in the agricultural community. Agricultur-
al production makes direct use of the land resource. The decisions
a farmer makes about how the land is used directly affect the suc-
cess of the fanning operation. Because agricultural regulation di-
rectly infringes on the farmer's freedom of choice with respect to
land use, it is readily considered undesirable federal land use regu-
lation.' 63
ed the importance of property ownership lies not only in its material benefits, but also in
the assistance property ownership provides in developing individual human autonomy).
159. Caldwell, supra note 157, at 324; see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accom-
modation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1529, 1555 (1989) (calling for new
limits on land ownership requiring more than simple restraint from land uses harming oth-
ers); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1966) (man's strictly economic rela-
tionship with the land entails privileges but no obligations; a "land-ethic" is required to
guide man through ecological situations where the path of social expediency is not dis-
cernible).
160. Caldwell, supra note 157, at 324; see Freyfogle, supra note 159, at 1555 (arguing
against protection of the landowner's expectation that he has the power to waste, destroy
and leave fallow the land); see also Tribe, supra note 157, at 1347 (criticizing the myo-
pic view often taken regarding the need for environmental protection policies).
161. Caldwell, supra note 157, at 325.
162. Id. at 329.
163. By contrast, most industrial production is much less dependent on land use deci-
sions. Accordingly, Congress is able to achieve many environmental goals by regulating
business conduct. While this business conduct takes place on privately held land, Congress
can regulate the conduct itself without directly regulating the use of the land. However,
distinguishing between regulation of business conduct and regulation of land use is often
difficult. For example, a given environmental regulation may be so severe that a particular
land use becomes commercially impractical. See California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587 (1987) (explaining that land use planning selects between
alternative uses of the land, while environmental regulation limits damage to the land re-
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The agricultural community generally considers itself a strong
steward of the land. Farmers take great pride in their ability to
manage a successful agricultural operation through independent land
use decisions1" and vigorously oppose perceived infringements
upon private ownership rights.1 65 However, a farmer's stewardship
generally is not focused on the public's interest in the land; rather,
the farmer focuses on his own private interest in making the high-
est and best use of the land.
Congress has realized that direct regulation of agricultural land
use would interfere with the independent spirit of the American
farmer and conflict with the farmer's perception of himself as a
strong steward of the land. Avoiding the potentially adverse politi-
cal ramifications, Congress has only taken minimal steps to provide
legal protection for private land as a public resource. Although
Congress has responded to the growing public support for protec-
tion of environmentally significant lands, Congress has declined to
test its relationship with farmers by directly regulating agricultural
land use decisions.'6 Instead, Congress has chosen to work in
partnership with the agricultural community to achieve conservation
goals. Control of the land through voluntary incentives neither
challenges nor expands the core concept of land ownership. There-
fore, the use of LURE acquisition programs permits Congress to
maintain its tradition of indirect, non-confrontational control over
agricultural land use decisions.
Furthermore, direct regulation of agricultural land use has been
unnecessary because the agricultural community is generally re-
sponsive to incentive-based conservation programs.167 This posi-
tive voluntary response is attributable to a unique aspect of an
gardless of how it is used).
164. See Church, supra note 143, at 545 ("The heart of American agriculture is the
independence and individual motivation of. . . landowning farmers.").
165. See Harry L. Pearson, Your Basic Rights Being Challenged, THE HOOsIER FARMER,
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 3 (noting that protection of private property rights is a high priority of
the American Farm Bureau Federation).
166. Interestingly, in response to dissatisfaction from environmentalists regarding the use
of incentives rather than direct regulation, Congress and the states often justify their inac-
tion by arguing that land use regulation is a local matter - a sentiment negated by the
ever-increasing federalization of land use controls. See Craig A. Arnold, Conserving Habi-
tats & Building Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land
Use Development, 10 STAN. ENv7. LJ. 1, 2-3 (1991) (noting that the federal government
exercises considerable control over land use decisions through such legislation as the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act).
167. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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agricultural landowner's stewardship. While a farmer's view of "the
best use of the land" includes short-term profitability, it may also
include a long-term perspective, frequently deriving from a desire
to pass on fertile land to children or grandchildren." The
"intergenerational equity" aspect of agricultural stewardship, though
distinguishable from a'recognition of "social rights" in the proper-
ty, promotes the same concept of managed use of the land for the
future."6 Thus, farmers who oppose the firmer controls of direct
land use regulation are generally receptive to incentives to preserve
agricultural land. 7 °
2. Direct Regulation May Constitute a Taking
Legislation which restricts particular uses of privately owned
land is subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Fifth Amend-
ment. 7 The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private
property for public use absent just compensation. It is well es-
tablished that although property may be regulated to some extent,
physical appropriation of property constitutes a taking. 73 On the
other hand, regulation which merely has an adverse effect on the
landowner's "bundle of property rights" is a more difficult prob-
lem.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the takings analysis
involves "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." 174 However, three
168. Current statistics indicate that close to one half of the owners of agricultural lands
are not the farmers of the land. See 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
1987 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, PART 51, UNITED STATES SUMMARY AND STATE DATA
49 (1989) (only 1,138,179 of the 2,082,759 farms in America are operated by those
whose principal occupation is fanning). Rather, farm operators run the farm on behalf of
the owner. Because many landowners can rely on income not supplied by farming, the
desire to generate high profit must compete with the desire to preserve future uses of the
land. These landowners may be particularly receptive to incentive-based conservation pro-
grams.
169. Ronald D. Culler, General Counsel, Indiana Cornm'r of Agriculture, Address at the
Governor's Conference on the Environment (June 29, 1992) (on file with the Case West-
ern Reserve Law Review).
170. Id.
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
172. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978)
(describing jurisprudential factors surrounding the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against
taking of property without just compensation); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (drilling of public wells on private land constitutes a taking requir-
ing just compensation).
173. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (recognizing
regulation preventing a landowner from mining coal on his land as a taking).
174. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; see also First English Evangelical Lu-
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factors are particularly significant for this inquiry: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation on the landowner; (2) the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action (i.e.,
whether the regulation constitutes a physical invasion or occupation
of real property).175
In addition, at least two categories of regulatory action are
deemed takings without further inquiry. First, regulations that com-
pel the property owner to suffer a permanent physical occupation
of the property require compensation, no matter how minute the
intrusion nor how weighty the public purpose.176 Second, com-
pensation is due when regulation denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of the land."V The latter category may be
available to some landowners as a result of regulation precluding
agricultural uses of land.
Finally, the Supreme Court has justified some regulations as
necessary exercises of the police power related to policies expected
to produce widespread public benefits. 17  The imposition of such
regulations may affect property values without invoking an obliga-
tion to compensate. 179 This principle was circumscribed by the
Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil.lr ° Lucas held that where regulation deprives land of all eco-
nomically beneficial use, the state can avoid compensation only if
it can identify principles of background nuisance or property law
that similarly prohibit the use. In other words, the state must show
theran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987) (while typical takings
result from state condemnation under power of eminent domain, takings can also occur
without formal proceedings); Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1373.
175. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
176. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(compelling acquiescence of landlords to placement of cable television facilities in apart-
ment buildings is a taking despite the fact that cable equipment would only occupy one
and one-half cubic feet of the property).
177. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (no taking
occurs where a land use regulation does not deny an owner economically viable use the
land).
178. See Penn Cent Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125, 133-34 (upholding land use regu-
lations where the state reasonably concludes that the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare will be protected); Golblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962) (uphold-
ing prohibition on mining operations in a residential area where ordinance would yield
safety benefits); Hadacheck v. Chief of Police, 239 U.S. 395, 410-11 (1915) (upholding
prohibition against manufacturing of bricks within city limits as a valid exercise of police
power).
179. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125, 133-34.
180. 112 S. CL 2886 (1992).
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that the proscribed use was not part of the landowner's original
title or bundle of rights."' 1 Thus, a state's ability to avoid com-
pensation for regulations which prohibit all productive uses of land
has been diminished."n
The Lucas Court, however, did not resolve a critical issue
underlying all regulatory takings cases; namely, the appropriate
property interest to be evaluated in the regulatory takings analy-
sis.'83 This underlying issue may be decisive in determining
whether regulations precluding agricultural uses of certain lands
constitute a taking. The divergent views regarding the appropriate
definition of property in takings cases are aptly expressed in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis.'84
The Keystone majority reiterated that a taking may be found in
a facial claim only if the regulation denies the landowner economi-
cally viable use of the land. 5 The majority stated that the ap-
propriate test requires a comparison of the value that has been
taken from the property as a whole and the value that remains with
the property.' The majority rejected the petitioners' view that
because they lost economically viable use of "certain segments" of
their property, a taking had occurred as to those particular
segments.' The dissenters accepted that proposition, however,
and opined that the takings analysis may focus on an identifiable
181. Id. at 2899.
182. Or, perhaps it is more accurate to say that a state may now be less inclined to
regulate land uses directly because of the problematic issues which inevitably arise from
the holding in Lucas, drawing the complex nuisance doctrine into the already difficult
takings analysis.
183. -Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible
use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property
interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured." Id. at 2894 n.7. The Court
did not resolve this issue primarily because the lower court found that the regulation in
question deprived Lucas of all economic value of his property. Id.
184. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
185. Id. at 495. The test of a facial claim that statutory enactment constitutes a taking
is whether the regulation denies an owner economically viable use of the land. See Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (distin-
guishing between a taldngs claim relating to the mere enactment of a statute and a claim
relating to the individual impact of government action by rejecting a claim filed before
enforcement of the statute).
186. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497. The majority noted that the issue in the case was
"whether there has been any taking at all when no coal has been physically appropriated,
and the regulatory program places a burden on the use of only a small fraction of the
property that is subjected to regulation." Id. at 499 n.27.
187. Id. at 496-97.
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segment of property, particularly where that segment is severable
and valuable in its own right.'
In Keystone, the regulation in question prevented the mining of
fifty percent of the coal beneath certain structures to avoid prob-
lems associated with subsidence.189 The majority noted that the
regulation required the petitioners to leave in place only two per-
cent of over 1.46 billion tons of coal, and that the petitioners had
not claimed that any of their four mines had failed to be profit-
able.1 In contrast, the dissent noted that the 27 million tons of
coal required to be left in the ground constituted an identifiable
and severable property interest."19 Further, the dissent noted that
unlike many property interests, the bundle of rights in coal is
sparse: "'For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the
right to mine it.'"'" According to the dissent, because the regula-
tion completely destroyed the petitioners' interest in a segment of
property required to be left in the ground, the regulation effectu-
ated a taking.' 93
The resolution of this point is crucial in determining whether
federal legislation precluding certain uses of agricultural land con-
stitutes a taking. Environmentally significant lands, such as
wetlands, riparian areas, highly erodible lands, windbreaks,
shelterbelts, or wildlife corridors, generally constitute discrete seg-
ments of the overall acreage used by a farmer. Under the Keystone
majority opinion, direct regulation precluding agricultural uses of
environmentally significant segments of property will not constitute
a taking if the landowner remains able to operate the farm profit-
ably.
Like coal, however, the bundle of rights in agricultural property
is sparse, consisting largely of the right to farm. Further, the Court
in Lucas noted that the answer
188. Id. at 517, 520 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
189. "[S]ubsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine, including land sur-
face, caused by extraction of underground coal.- Id. at 474. Subsidence is well recognized
as an environmental concern. See F.T. LEE & J.F. ABEL, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERI-
OR, SUBSIDENCE FROM UNDERGROUND MINING, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY Circular 876 at 1, 9,
12 (1983) (citing aquifer contamination and methane gas poisoning of animal and plant
life as possible environmental harms due to subsidence).
190. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496.
191. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
192. Id. (quoting Commonwealth ex reL Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820, 820
(1917)).
193. Id. at 518.
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may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have
been shaped by the State's law of property - i.e., whether
and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land
with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a dimi-
nution in (or elimination of) value." '
Both federal and state laws have recognized a landowner's right to
farm."9 Thus, under the dissent's view, regulation vitiating that
right could constitute a taking affecting discrete segments of the
land.
In essence, the determination that state action constitutes a
taking requires the general public, rather than an individual owner,
to pay the costs of regulating the property for a public pur-
pose. 196 As noted previously, the purpose of congressional land
use regulation is to promote stewardship on behalf of the general
society and to protect societal rights in private lands." For this
reason, the Supreme Court affirmed the notion that private
landowners should be compensated when they are called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of their property for the
sake of the public good.19
However, the fact that legislation precluding certain land uses
will trigger the Fifth Amendment does not mean that Congress
cannot regulate. Rather, it only means that when Congress does
regulate, compensation is due. Therefore, the financial implications
of direct regulation are a significant concern for the federal govern-
ment. If direct regulation constitutes a taking, the compensation due
to a landowner, on an individual basis, is most likely equivalent to
the cost of a LURE.1" However, direct regulation may result in
194. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
195. For example, the sodbuster and swampbuster programs in the 1985 Farm Bill allow
the farm owner or operator to decide whether to farm protected lands. See, e.g., 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 3811-3813 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that any person electing to produce
an agricultural crop on erodible land shall become ineligible for various benefits such as
price supports or crop insurance). Although the legislation is deprivative, farning activity
itself is not expressly regulated; in effect, these provisions recognize a "right to farm." In
addition, numerous states have enacted -right to farm" laws. See 13 NEIL E. HARL, AGRI-
CULTURAL LAW § 124.01 (1991).
196. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492.
197. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
198. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 (stating that there are good reasons for finding that
a taking has occurred where a landowner loses use of the land for the common good).
199. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (cash payments to farmers for
LUREs are limited to the fair market value of the land without the LURE less the fair
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affected landowners invoking inverse condemnation,2' forcing the
government to incur substantial expenses in an ad hoe manner. In
contrast, the use of LURE acquisition programs enables the govern-
ment to make annual decisions regarding the allocation of resources
for regulation of land use.2"' Thus, the use of LUREs to accom-
plish regulatory goals is not only more politically acceptable, but
also more fiscally manageable.
3. Market Based Considerations
In addition to the economic consequences of regulation with
respect to the takings question, economic characteristics of the
agricultural market should also be considered. Society cannot share
the economic burden resulting from agricultural regulation in the
same way that society absorbs the burden of other environmental
regulations. The cost of compliance with direct environmental regu-
lation is generally internalized by industry and passed to the con-
sumer.2" For example, the cost of obtaining permits under the
Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act can generally be reduced to
dollar amounts and recouped from society through price mecha-
nisms.20
3
The cost of compliance with agricultural land use regulations,
in contrast, is not so readily recouped. First, it is more difficult to
place a dollar value on restricted use of agricultural lands. The
primary cost associated with protection of wetlands or other envi-
ronmentally significant lands is reduced productivity in a given.
year.2' Because external variables affect agricultural productivity
market of the land encumbered by the LURE).
200. Inverse condemnation describes the manner in which a landowner recovers com-
pensation for a taking of property when condemnation proceedings have not been institut-
ed. Agins, 447 U.S. at 258 n.2.
201. The 1990 Farm Bill directed the Secretary to establish a wetlands priority conser-
vation plan. See 16 U.S.C. § 3921 (1988). The plan must prioritize the types of wetlands
and interests in wetlands for acquisition by federal and state governments. Id. § 3921.
202. See Arnold W. Reitze, A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked;
What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTh. L. 1549, 1619 (1991) (noting that the cost
of emissions controls contributes to higher prices paid by consumers).
203. See, e.g., Agency to Seek Rate Hike for Air-Pollution Permits, Bus. FIRST - Lou-
isville, May 25, 1992, at 1 (noting that per ton emissions fees for operating permits under
the Clean Air Act will require businesses to pay more); Environmental Price Tags,
NATION'S Bus., Apr. 1992, at 36 (surveying small business efforts to pass on costs of
environmental compliance through higher prices).
204. See LW. LOONEY ET AL, AGRICULTURAL LAW: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO REPRE-
SENTING FARM CLIENTS 240-41 (1990) (economic factors bearing on a decision to imple-
ment conservation efforts include the cost of the measures and the loss of productivity
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from year to year, the loss in productivity due to land use regu-
lation is difficult to isolate and quantify.2" Further, true costs are
difficult to assess, since decreases in productivity may be offset by
gains from maintaining a healthy ecosystem over the life of the
farm.2 °6 Similarly, it is difficult to measure the ecological or so-
cietal benefits of wetlands, shelterbelts, wildlife corridors, or farm-
lands.2" Indeed, many people would view the permanent loss of
environmentally significant land characteristics as an immeasurable
cost. Thus, the cost to ensure the continued existence of these
lands may be too high to internalize and distribute through tradi-
tional pricing processes.208
Additionally, the agriculture industry is unique in that farmers
are "price takers," not price setters." In contrast to most indus-
tries, the market price for crops is determined by a complex mar-
keting chain.2"' Therefore, farmers inquire what price they will be
from idled land). See also JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER AND JAMES B. WADLEY,
ARGICULTURAL LAW (1983).
205. Agricultural production is regularly subject to numerous uncontrollable factors such
as weather, pests, disease, etc. See Orlando E. Deluge, A Comprehensive State and Local
Government Land Use Control Strategy to Preserve the Nation's Farmland is Unnecessary
and Unwise, 34 KAN. L. REV. 519, 530 (1986) (noting the "wide variety of factors" af-
fecting overall farm output).
206. See id. at 531 (noting that the decrease in soil erosion has contributed to an in-
crease in agricultural output over the last fifty years).
207. See Steven L. Dickerson, The Evolving Federal Wetland Program, 44 Sw. LJ.
1473, 1475-76 (1991) (the economic value of wetlands often goes unnoticed until, in their
absence, the harmful effects of water pollution, lake eutrophication and land erosion are
felt). Many farmland benefits actually occur off the farm. "[E]ven erosion control, which
is typically perceived as benefiting the farmer by preserving the productibility of the soil,
produces only minor on-farm benefits." George A. Gould, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source
Pollution, and Federal Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 461, 487 (1990).
208. See Gould, supra note 207, at 487 (stating that only the "most saintly" farmer
would internalize such costs).
209. Farmers are price takers because, unlike most industries, they do not establish the
price for their products. See id. at 488 (noting that as price takers farmers have little
ability to pass on production costs to consumers); see also C.B. Baker, Structural Issues
in U.S. Agriculture and Farm Debt Perspectives, 34 KAN. L. REV. 457 (1986) (noting the
burden of imposing prices on farmers); Gerald Tones, Theoretical Problems with the
Environmental Regulation of Agriculture, 8 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 206 (1989) (comparing
the status of farmers as price takers to the paradigm of perfect competition where no
producer can affect the price received for his goods single-handedly).
210. The Chicago Board of Trade, a commodities exchange, establishes a base price for
agricultural commodities. The price paid for products at local grain elevators is generally
calculated according to the current Board of Trade price and the elevator's "basis," which
takes into account storage and other costs, as well as transportation costs to terminal
markets. Telephone Interview with Ronald D. Culler, General Counsel, Indiana Comm'r of
Agriculture (Aug. 1992). For a more detailed discussion of commodities trading, see NOR-
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paid for the crop at the local grain elevator; they do not calculate
the inputs invested and negotiate an appropriate selling price.2"
Farmers have little ability to pass on to consumers the added costs
of production or the costs of lost opportunities."
Direct regulation of agricultural land uses also impairs fair
competition in the agricultural industry. Because the significance of
wetlands, riparian areas, and highly erodible lands varies according
to geographic location, direct regulation has a disparate impact on
agricultural producers in different regions of the country. Unlike
the manufacturing of goods, agriculture has no set rules for produc-
ing an abundant crop; farming practices must be readily adaptable
and often change annually. 13 By contrast, a typical manufactur-
ing process is likely to remain uniform nationally from year to
year. Direct regulation restricting uses of environmentally signifi-
cant lands would affect some farmers to a greater extent than oth-
ers, depending on geographic characteristics of the cropland or
production circumstances of a given year.214 The potential result
is that some agricultural producers may obtain an unfair competi-
tive advantage.
Because society is not a ready partner in absorbing the costs of
agricultural land use regulation, direct federal regulation of agricul-
tural land is not economically justified, even if constitutionally
valid. An alternative to direct regulation is encouraging conserva-
tion practices through incentives. The use of LUREs as an incen-
tive to protect environmentally significant lands is politically ac-
ceptable, fiscally manageable, and economically justifiable. Unlike
direct regulation, LURE acquisition programs are an appropriate
means to attain conservation and preservation goals. However,
MAN W. THORSON, COMMODITY FUTURES CONTRACrS § 5.21; Hedging and Basis Trad-
ing, in JOHN IL DAVIDSON, AGRICULTURAL LAW (1981 & Supp. 1989).
211. See Baker, supra note 209, at 460 (noting that "markets transmit prices to farmers
who respond with decisions on what and how much to produce and with what combina-
tion of resources and production practices.-).
212. See Gould, supra note 207, at 488; Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint
Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 CH.-KENT L. REV. 479, 490 (1989) (not-
ing that farmers are an unorganized production group and therefore have difficulty passing
costs of land use controls to consumers).
213. See Deluge, supra note 205, at 526 (noting the signaling effect of agricultural
prices which reflects changes in the agricultural economy and transmits this information to
farmers, causing rational farmers to react quickly and efficiently).
214. See Gould, supra note 207, at 488 (noting the heterogeneous nature of the farm
economy and the disparate impact of pollution control efforts on farmers).
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LUREs are the better policy choice only if they achieve conserva-
tion goals in a cost-effective, efficient manner.
B. Incentives: The Better Policy Choice Only if Efficient and
Effective
To assure that LURE acquisition programs achieve conservation
goals, they must be structured to permit the acquisition of enforce-
able, perpetual LUREs efficiently and effectively. To maximize its
return on the investment of scarce public funds, the federal govern-
ment should be able to acquire LUREs with minimal research into
each state's real property laws. In addition, the federal government
should be able to enforce easement restrictions in perpetuity. Thus,
a critical question is whether federal or state laws should determine
the permissible duration of the easements. In resolving this ques-
tion, Congress must choose from among two competing alterna-
tives. Federal legislation may permit state law to determine the
maximum duration of LUREs. Alternatively, federal legislation may
preempt state law limitations on duration.
The 1990 Farm Bill answered this question with great inconsis-
tency. On one hand, in the Conservation Title, the WRP and the
EEP expressly permit state law to determine the maximum duration
of the LUREs acquired by the federal government.215 On the oth-
er hand, the FLP in the Forestry Title authorizes the federal gov-
ernment to acquire LUREs in perpetuity despite state law to the
contrary.216 While authorizing a number of programs relating to
the purchase of LUREs, the 1990 Farm Bill does not conclusively
resolve whether federal or state laws govern duration.
Besides these contradictory provisions, other LURE programs
are ambiguous about whether federal or state laws govern duration.
215. The WRP prescribes that -[a] conservation easement granted under this section ...
shall be for 30 years, permanent, or the maximum duration allowed under applicable
State laws." 16 U.S.C. § 3837a(e)(2) (Supp. H1 1990) (emphasis added). Similarly, the
EEP provision states that: "The Secretary shall ... carry out an environmental easement
program . .. through the acquisition of permanent easements or easements for the maxi-
mum term permitted under applicable State law from willing owners of eligible farms or
ranches in order to ensure the continued long-term protection of environmentally sensitive
lands . . . ." Id. § 3839(a) (emphasis added).
216. Id. § 2103c(c), (d)(1), (k)(2) ("Notwithstanding any provision of state law, no
conservation easement held by the United States ... shall be limited in duration or
scope."). The statute further provides: "Notwithstanding any provision of State law, conser-
vation easements shall be construed to effect the Federal purposes for which they were
acquired and, in interpreting their terms, there shall be no presumption favoring the con-
servation easement holder or fee owner." Id. § 2103c(k)(3).
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These ambiguous provisions authorize the federal government to
acquire perpetual LUREs, but they do not preempt contrary state
law limitations on duration. For example, the RECP directs that
LUREs acquired by the federal government must be for a term of
at least fifty years. 7 While the 1985 amendments removed a
perpetual duration requirement and substituted the current fifty year
minimum, the government is still authorized to acquire LUREs for
terms greater than fifty years, including LUREs of perpetual dura-
tion. However, the RECP provisions do not expressly preempt state
limits on duration, nor do they expressly incorporate state laws
governing duration.
Similarly, the CRP provisions do not preempt state law limita-
tions on duration. The CRP provisions condition conversions to the
WRP on the grant of a long-term or permanent LURE.21 Al-
though the conversion provisions are not explicit, LUREs acquired
through conversion to the WRP presumably fall within the WRP
provisions incorporating state law.
The FmHA LURE provisions require the Secretary to impose
perpetual LUREs upon the disposition of specified properties in the
federal inventory. 219 The LUREs established pursuant to this sec-
tion may be held by state governmental entities, private nonprofit
organizations, or the federal government. ° The FmHA debt-ser-
vicing provisions require LUREs of at least 50 years, and specifi-
cally allow for longer terms under certain circumstances."1 How-
ever, since the debt-servicing provisions do not incorporate state
laws governing duration, it is unclear whether state laws can pro-
hibit perpetual LUREs.m At the same time, the provisions do
not expressly state that federal law will preempt contrary state laws
limiting duration.
The Watershed program and the Farms Act authorize the feder-
217. 16 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988) (authorizing the Secretary to purchase easements for a
term of not less than 50 years).
218. 16 U.S.C. § 3835a(b)(2) (Supp. I 1990).
219. 7 U.S.C. § 1985(g)(1) (Supp. U 1990).
220. Id. § 1985(c)(1) (permitting the Secretary to convey non-possessory interests held
by the United States to a unit of state or local government or to a private nonprofit
organization, if a buyer who is eligible for assistance under other farm programs is not
found within a specified period).
221. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1951, subpt. S, exhibit H, § VI (1992) (requiring terms of easements
to be no less than 50 years and providing for longer easements in certain circumstances,
such as to protect a species covered under international treaty).
222. However, the FrmHA debt restructuring provisions provide a cooperative approach
by using both federal and state officials as a part of an Easement Review Team.
439
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
al government to assist approved sponsors in the acquisition of
perpetual LUREs.3 Under both programs the federal government
is not the holder of the LURE. The Farms Act regulations require
the borrower to show that the LURE will be valid, perpetual and
enforceable. 4 Regulations governing the Watershed program may
use a similar approach. Although the programs do not expressly
authorize LUREs to be perpetual notwithstanding state laws, only
those states with laws permitting perpetual LUREs can benefit from
these programs.
The uncertainty and inconsistency resulting from the LURE
acquisition provisions in the 1990 Farm Bill hinder the effective
use of LUREs by the federal government. The choice is between
permitting state law to govern duration or expressly preempting
state law limitations on duration. Selecting the latter approach will
ensure that all LUREs acquired under federal conservation pro-
grams are perpetual. A policy decision should be made enabling
the federal government to acquire perpetual LUREs and to enforce
restrictions in perpetuity. By minimizing the need for research into
individual state property laws, and- by maximizing the return on
investment of public funds, federal LURE acquisition programs will
be permitted to function efficiently and effectively.
Importantly, the authorization of perpetual LUREs and the
preemption of contrary state law limitations on duration raise fun-
damental federalism concerns. These concerns result from the con-
dition rendering perpetual LUREs enforceable despite state laws to
the contrary, rather than from the inherent use of voluntary ease-
ment acquisition programs. In other words, may the federal govern-
ment acquire an enforceable property right from a landowner that
is not part of the landowner's "bundle of rights" under state law?
Further, even if the federal government is permitted to acquire a
property right not recognized by state law, may it convey that right
to private nonprofit entities or local governments, when private
entities and local governments cannot obtain similar rights under
state property laws?
223. See 16 U.S.C. § 1003a(a) (Supp. I 1990) (providing for cost share assistance
programs enabling sponsors of watershed protection projects to acquire conservation ease-
ments); 1990 Farm Bill, Pub. L No. 101-624, § 1465, 104 Stat. 3359, 3616, reprinted in
7 U.S.C. § 4201 (Supp. II 1990) (establishing federal assistance program for state trust
funds used to preserve farmland resources).
224. See Farms for the Future Act of 1990, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,116, 48,119 (1991) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.IL § 1980.920) (requiring borrowers to obtain legal authority to acquire
developmental rights easements and to enforce the easement terms in perpetuity).
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If a federal law authorizing enforceable perpetual LUREs is a
proper exercise of congressional power under the Constitution, the
federal law will preempt contrary state laws. However, because
state laws traditionally control the acquisition and transfer of prop-
erty and define resulting rights and responsibilities, 25 the federal
law may readily be seen as an intrusion on state sovereignty. Be-
fore engaging in a policy analysis of the alternative choices for
LURE acquisition programs, it must first be determined whether
the federal government may constitutionally require LUREs to be
perpetual. Therefore, the next section examines whether federal
legislation authorizing enforceable, perpetual LUREs is a proper
exercise of congressional power despite constitutional protections of
state sovereignty.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
AUTHORIZING PERPETUAL LUREs AND PREEMPTING STATE LAW
LIMITATIONS ON DURATION
Congress has opted to pursue conservation and preservation of
the land resource through the more politically acceptable, economi-
cally justifiable and fiscally prudent means of incentives. Therefore,
the constitutional question is whether Congress may exercise the
spending power and the property power to enact legislation autho-
rizing the federal government to acquire enforceable, perpetual
LUREs that preempt contrary state laws limiting duration."
LURE acquisition programs authorize the federal government to
purchase interests in realty from willing landowners so long as the
landowners agree to certain restrictive terms. 7 It is well estab-
lished that the federal government may use the property power to
acquire property and interests in property through negotiated pur-
chase. The federal government may use that property to attain any
end within the scope of its enumerated powers.' Further, pursu-
ant to the spending power, Congress may buy property from will-
225. This tradition is demonstrated by judicial application of state law to determine
property rights, even when construing federal legislation. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (allowing state definition of real prop-
erty to control question of whether government property would be taxed, since the state
definition did not run counter to terms of the federal act).
226. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419-20 (1992) (appropriate in-
quiry is whether, from among possible alternatives, Congress chose a permissible method
to preempt state regulations governing low level radioactive waste).
227. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
228. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
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ing landowners to promote the general welfare. 29 Thus, the con-
stitutional issues examined in this article go beyond whether Con-
gress has the power to enact LURE acquisition programs.
Rather, the more complex issue is whether federal LURE pro-
grams may subject the availability of funds to a condition that the
LURE must be perpetual despite state laws to the contrary.
Subissues include whether Congress can legislate that the federal
government may acquire a property right that is not a cognizable
aspect of the grantor's "bundle of rights" under state property law,
and whether this property right will be enforceable when trans-
ferred to third parties. Arguably, the property right acquired by the
federal government is inconsistent with a state's public policy as
reflected in its property laws. The key question, then, is whether
the federal spending program has - through a particular condition
- overstepped the bounds of fundamental federalism.
The essence of federalism is that "states as states" have legiti-
mate interests which the national government must respect even
though federal laws, if constitutionally proper, are supreme.'3
Unfortunately, federalism concerns often go unappreciated. This is
attributable in part to recent decisions of the Supreme Court and in
part to the surprisingly large population of lawyers, including those
in Congress, who lack a sufficient understanding of federalism. 3
While the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority?23 has tempered protection of state
autonomy, 3  federalism concerns regarding the appropriate bal-
ance of powers between the states and the federal government are
still relevant in assessing exercises of congressional power.34
229. See infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
230. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985). See gener-
ally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1484 (1981).
231. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 147, at 51-52 (noting academic view that Supreme
Court decisions during the New Deal disposed of serious constitutional concern for feder-
alism and allocated questions of governmental power to the political branches of govern-
ment); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The Law Schools' Failing Grade on Federalism, 92 YALE
LJ. 1349, 1355 (1983) (although issues of federalism deserve detailed law school atten-
tion, they have largely been ignored and left to economists, think tanks, and public policy
schools).
232. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
233. See Id. at 554.
234. Id. at 586 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also New York v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992) (although the scope of the federal government's authority with
respect to states has changed over the years, the federal structure required by the Consti-
tution remains unchanged).
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State sovereignty has strong defenders on the Supreme Court: Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor have expressed their belief
that the "Court will in time again assume its constitutional respon-
sibility" to define the scope of protected state autonomy. 2
5
Even if states do not object to federal legislation that infringes
on their autonomy, the Supreme Court has still noted that federal-
ism concerns must be addressed to uphold the fundamental purpose
of our government's federal structure:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States
for the benefit of the States or state governments as ab-
stract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public
officials governing the States. To the contrary, the Constitu-
tion divides authority between federal and state govern-
ments for the protection of individuals.'
The notion that federalism protects individuals is significant be-
cause, although some states have expressed concerns about the
amount of federal land holdings within their boundaries, 7 many
states are not likely to object to federal legislation authorizing
perpetual LUREs. Most states recognize the importance of conserv-
ing or preserving environmentally significant lands, yet lack the
requisite funds to operate effective state acquisition programs. Ac-
cordingly, before advocating federal legislation to authorize perpet-
ual LUREs and preempt state limitations on duration, it is crucial
to ensure that fundamental federalism precepts are maintained.
Legislation conditioning the availability of federal funds in
exchange for a LURE on terms requiring the LURE to be perpetu-
al is a conditional offer of federal funds. The use of such a condi-
tional offer is a means within Congress' spending power.z 8 Fur-
ther, in cases where the federal government is the holder, the
LURE creates enforceable rights in the federal government. In
these cases, legislation authorizing the LURE is analogous to a rule
respecting property interests belonging to the United States - a
means within Congress' property powerY 9 Therefore, the federal
legislation can be characterized as an exercise of the spending
power for the general welfare and as an exercise of the property
235. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
236. New York, 112 S. CL at 2431.
237. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
239. See discussion infra part ]fl.B.
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power to create enforceable rights protecting the federal interest in
conservation.' u Within the appropriate doctrinal frameworks, this
section will analyze the constitutionality of federal legislation au-
thorizing enforceable, perpetual LUREs and preempting contrary
state law limitations on duration.
A. The Spending Power Analysis
Article I of the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States .... .241 The proper interpretation
of this language was at one time a point of considerable de-
bate. u2  However, in United States v. Butler,243  the Supreme
Court approved the theory that the clause should be construed as a
grant of a distinct enumerated power to spend for the "general"
welfare as distinguished from a local or particular purpose.2 "
240. Although the "means" used by Congress through the LURE provisions are not
within the scope of the commerce power, the "ends- or objectives of the LURE provi-
sions in agricultural legislation can be characterized as an effectuation of congressional
Commerce Clause policies. For example, environmentally important lands such as
forestlands, farmland and highly erodible croplands, wetlands, riparian corridors and wild-
life habitats directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce; by virtue of their important
'role in the ecosystems, these lands generate marketable commodities and hence interstate
movement. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324 (1981) (prime farmland is a federal
interest that Congress may address through the commerce power); cf. George C. Coggins
& William H. Hensley, Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Protect and Manage
Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered?, 61 IoWA L REV. 1099, 1146
(1976) (arguing Congress has virtually unlimited power to set aside property for national
parks and refuges to protect local wildlife).
Further, lands protected by LUREs may be used for fishing or hunting or for wild-
life habitats. These uses of the land draw people for recreational or scientific purposes
and may affect interstate movement. See United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th
Cir. 1979) (holding that recreational and scientific use of inland lakes significantly affects
interstate commerce). Accordingly, federal legislation permitting perpetual LUREs, and
furthering commerce policies by assuring long-term protection, may also fall within the
category of an exercise of the necessary and proper power to effectuate both a congres-
sional policy within the scope of the commerce power, as well as extraneous ends. See
discussion supra section I.A and infra section II.C.
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
242. Madison asserted that the power to spend was limited to the legislative fields enu-
merated by the Constitution. Hamilton, on the other hand, maintained that the spending
clause confers a power separate and distinct from the other enumerated powers. United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1935); see Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal
Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L REV. 1103, 1111-13 (1987) (surveying histori-
cal interpretations of the spending power).
243. 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
244. Id. at 66-67. The opinion in Butler reflects the Hamiltonian view that the words
[Vol. 43:401
PERPETUAL CONSERVATION
Butler is instructive because in that case the Court implied that an
agricultural subsidies program promoted the general welfare even
though the program only benefitted farmers who set aside certain
land. 5 Later decisions firmly established that federal spending
for agriculture programs promotes the general welfare.2' Because
LUREs are an agricultural incentive program similar to the pro-
gram in Butler, they may also be considered an exercise of the
power to spend for the general welfare.
The scope of the spending power is expansive. It has been
broadly construed to authorize spending that cannot be justified as
an exercise of other enumerated powers.247 Further, within certain
limits, Congress may impose conditions on recipients of federal
spending to compel or encourage conduct which could not be com-
pelled through direct regulation. 24 The limits are twofold. First,
'general welfare" are intended to limit and define the power to tax and spend. Id. at 65-
66; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that pub-
lic financing of presidential elections is a constitutional exercise of congressional power to
spend for the general welfare).
245. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 66. However, the Agricultural Assistance Act of 1933 was
invalidated because it encroached upon a subject reserved to the states. Id. at 68. It has
been noted that the Court in Butler was still influenced by the theory of "dual federal-
ism" which maintains that congressional exercises of legislative power must fall not only
within specific enumerated powers, but also must not cross the line into realms tradition-
ally reserved to the states. Rosenthal, supra note 242, at 1126 n.105. The theory of dual
federalism and the corollary theory that the Tenth Amendment reduced the powers of the
federal government were both rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 116-17, 123-24 (1941).
246. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 275 U.S. 275, 294 (1957); United States v.
Gerach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950).
247. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (limitation on the
spending power is not a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Con-
gress is not empowered to achieve directly); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-91 (upholding estab-
lishment of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund as an expenditure to promote the
general welfare). Since the Butler case, the Court has never held that an exercise of the
spending power failed to meet the "general welfare" criterion. Rosenthal, supra note 242,
at 1113.
248. See New York v. United States, 112 S. CL 2408, 2419 (1992) (as conventional
notions of proper objects of government spending have changed, so has the ability of
Congress to fix the terms on which it disburses federal funds); see also Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). In Steward Machine, the Court upheld the unemploy-
ment insurance program provided in the Social Security Act. Id. at 585. The Act imposed
a federal tax on employers, along with a 90 percent credit against the tax for employers
in states that adopted their own unemployment compensation plans meeting federal stan-
dards. Id. at 574-76. Thus, the Court upheld the imposition of a condition intended to
induce states to establish unemployment compensation plans - even though Congress
could not directly require states to do so. Id. at 585; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 473-75 (1980) (holding Congress may constitutionally condition receipt of feder-
al money on compliance with federal statutory and administrative directives); Lau v.
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the spending power may not either directly249  or indirectly'
infringe upon individual liberties. Second, the Spending Clause
does not empower Congress to overstep established federalism
limitations.
The constitutionality of a conditional exercise of the spending
power depends upon the propriety of the condition imposed."'
Accordingly, although LURE acquisition programs inherently fall
within the scope of the spending power, the condition that federal
LUREs must be perpetual despite state laws to the contrary also
must survive constitutional scrutiny.
In South Dakota v. Dole, 2 the Supreme Court set forth a
four-part test to determine whether conditions imposed under fed-
eral spending programs are constitutional. According to the Court,
conditions on an offer of federal funds must be: (1) in pursuit of
the general welfare; 3 (2) unambiguous such that the election to
participate is done knowingly;2 4 (3) related to a federal interest
in particular national programs; 255 and (4) unobstructed by any
independent Constitutional bar.5 The first three prongs of this
test relate to whether a condition falls within the scope of the
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) (holding Congress may constitutionally ban discrim-
ination in state educational programs receiving federal financial assistance).
249. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38 (sustaining the grant of public funds for presiden-
tial candidates in part because the grant did not impinge on individual liberties).
250. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (noting that a federal spending program may not con-
dition the receipt of federal monies on terns requiring invidiously discriminatory state
action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment).
251. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JoHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
20.11 (2d ed. 1992); see also Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Con-
stitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 742 (1982) (criticiz-
ing the doctrine that the Constitution does not tolerate the "Hobson's choice- inherent in
conditioning one constitutional right on the forfeiture of another).
252. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The condition analyzed in Dole stemmed from a congressio-
nal directive to the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal high-
way funds from states which allowed persons less than 21 years of age to lawfully pur-
chase alcoholic beverages. The condition was challenged as a violation of the Twenty-First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 205.
253. Id. at 207. The Court noted that the concept of the "general welfare" is largely
shaped by Congress. Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-45 (1937)).
254. Id. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
255. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)). It is still uncertain whether furtherance of a mere policy of the federal govern-
ment will sustain conditional spending unless that policy may be carried out pursuant to
one of Congress's enumerated powers. Rosenthal, supra note 242, at 1131.
256. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist.,
469 U.S. 256 (1985)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976).
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spending power itself; the fourth prong relates to whether the con-
dition violates any constitutional limitation intended to protect
individual liberties or state sovereignty.
The offer of federal funds under the LURE provisions is an
expenditure of federal money to ensure the continued viability of
environmentally significant ecosystems and their aesthetic and rec-
reational values.257 Congress recognizes the importance of con-
serving and preserving important land resources for the public
interest2 8 A condition requiring LUREs under federal conserva-
tion programs to be perpetual despite state law limitations on dura-
tion promotes the long-term benefits of the spending program.
Under the broad construction of the spending power, the condition
readily promotes the general welfare. Further, the condition is
clearly related to the purpose of federal conservation programs and
can be drafted unambiguously. Thus, the condition falls within the
scope of Congress' spending power under the first three prongs of
the test 'set forth in Dole.
However, it is less obvious that the condition meets the fourth
prong of the Dole test, at least as to state sovereignty. Certainly,
the condition does not infringe on individual liberties. An example
of a breach of an independent constitutional bar protecting individ-
ual liberties would be a federal program conditioning a grant on a
farmer's promise not to criticize the government's agricultural poli-
cies; the condition would be unconstitutional as an infringement of
the farmer's freedom of speech under the First Amendment." 9
Since individual liberties are not at stake when a landowner volun-
tarily conveys a LURE subject to the condition that the LURE will
be perpetual, the condition does not impede individual liberties.
In contrast, because state laws traditionally control the acquisi-
tion and transfer of property and define the resulting rights and
responsibilities,226 the condition may be perceived as an intrusion
on state sovereignty. Although protection of state sovereignty de-
rives primarily from the Tenth Amendment, 26' this limit on
257. See discussion supra part LB.
258. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
259. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, § 20.11.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)
(noting that most American property law is grounded in state statutory and common law);
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Co., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (noting that concepts
of real property are deeply rooted in state customs, traditions, habits, and laws).
261. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
1 1993
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Congress' power is not derived from the text of the amendment
itself. 62 Rather, the Tenth Amendment requires an examination
of whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a sepa-
rate and distinct limitation on an enumerated power.2 63 For exam-
ple, the Spending Clause does not empower Congress to require
states to regulate because established Commerce Clause doctrine
precludes such action as an infringement on state sovereignty.2"
Therefore, the inquiry under the fourth prong of the Dole test is
whether a federal condition that LUREs be perpetual, despite con-
trary state laws, violates a limitation on the spending power, or any
other enumerated power, intended to protect state sovereignty.
In Dole, the Court reiterated that the spending power doctrine
provides little protection for state sovereignty.265 The rationale for
the lack of protection in the context of federal spending is that if
states accept federal payments, they must also accept the federal
conditions: "Requiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily
assumed as a condition of federal funding before recognizing their
ownership of funds simply does not intrude on their sovereign-
ty., 26 Thus, essential attributes of state and local government au-
tonomy have received little protection in conditional spending cas-
es. Courts have upheld deep intrusions into traditional state realms
through conditional spending, including the redistribution of author-
ity between a state's executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment,267 and the overriding of state laws concerning the use of
federal funds.268
the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
262. See id.
263. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992).
264. Id. at 2429.
265. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (citing Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127
(1947)). In Oklahoma, the Court upheld a provision of the Hatch Act which conditioned
receipt of federal funds on the removal of a state official whose employment was fi-
nanced in part by federal funds due to the state official's political activities. 330 U.S. at
142-44.
266. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790 (1983); see also Pennhurst State Sch. v.
Haldermann, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (stating that Congress traditionally sets the terms upon
which it disburses federal money to the states); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34
(1968) (stating that unless barred by the Constitution, the federal government may impose
conditions on disbursements to the states that preempt state law).
267. See Shapp v. Sloan, 391 A.2d 595 (Pa. 1978) (upholding legislation prohibiting a
state treasurer from disbursing federal funds without a specific appropriation by the state
legislature), appeal dismissed sub nom., Thorburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); cf.
Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 142-44 (upholding condition requiring removal of a state officer
who engaged in political activities prohibited by the Federal Hatch Act).
268. See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985) (up-
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Nonetheless, the Court in Dole implied that the Tenth Amend-
ment may preclude financial inducements offered by Congress that
pass the point of "pressure" and become "compulsion." 269 Al-
though the Court did not indicate where this point occurs, it found
that the risk of losing five percent of federal highway funds did
not render the condition an unconstitutional intrusion into state
autonomy.'7 By analogy, federal conditions on LURE acquisi-
tions cannot reasonably be considered "compulsion" because the
state is not at risk of losing significant federal funds. Rather, the
programs permit the state or its residents to benefit from a new
source of federal funds by accepting federal conditions.
Of course, those spending power cases which address the ex-
tent of constitutional protection provided for state sovereignty gen-
erally involve conditional offers to states themselves. These condi-
tional offers attempt to achieve state compliance with federal pur-
poses where direct regulation may not be appropriate.27' Of the
LURE acquisition programs outlined in this article,2' only the
Farms Act and Watershed Program involve conditional offers to the
states themselves. Yet even these programs are distinguishable
because the conditional federal assistance in both programs may be
invoked by private nonprofit entities as well. 3 However, because
these programs require the holder to prove that LUREs acquired
with federal assistance will be valid, perpetual and enforceable,
each state may choose whether or not to permit its residents to
obtain federal benefits in exchange for perpetual LUREs. Because
the state may elect to enact legislation conforming to the condition
in the federal spending program, this use of the spending power
requires only a minimal extension of Dole to be found constitution-
al.
In contrast, the other federal LURE programs described in this
article involve conditional offers to individual landowners who
convey LUREs to the federal government.2 4 The constitutionality
holding legislation authorizing units of local government to use their share of federal
funds more expansively for more purposes than permitted by state law).
269. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., IS. at 211-12 (upholding the use of the spending power by Congress to
coerce states, through the threat of reducing federal highway funds, to raise the minimum
drinldng age to twenty-one years to reduce automobile-related injuries and death).
272. See discussion supra part 1.B.2.
273. See supra notes 123, 127 and accompanying text.
274. Le., the CRP, WRP, EEP, FLP, RECP and the FmHA debt-restructuring program.
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of a conditional offer to an individual which may result in the
federal government acquiring a property right not recognized by
state property law is less apparent. The Dole rationale limiting
protection for state sovereignty in spending cases does not apply
because a private landowner initiates the intrusive transaction with-
out the state's knowledge.
States, however, are not politically powerless against federal
intrusions initiated by individual landowners. In Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,"5 the Court rejected the
concept of discrete areas of traditional state sovereignty and con-
cluded that participation in the national political process provides
states with sufficient safeguards against federal intrusions.276 Al-
though the Court in Dole did not rely on Garcia to explain why
state sovereignty receives little protection in spending power cases,
federal spending programs will not be invalidated merely because
they intrude into discrete areas traditionally reserved to states and
thereby influence local activities.2" This is true even though a
state may be unaware of a particular intrusion. The national politi-
cal process is equally available to moderate the federal legislation
enabling such intrusions."
The recent case of New York v. United States279 further bol-
See discussion infra part IV.B. The provision requiring the FrmHA to place perpetual
LUREs on properties in its inventory does not involve conditional spending at all. Howev-
er, it falls squarely within the scope of the Article IV property power. See supra notes
89-93 and accompanying text and discussion infra part IV.B.2.
275. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
276. Id. at 551-56. The concept of discrete areas reserved for states in a Tenth Amend-
ment analysis had been set forth only 9 years earlier. See National League of Cities v.
User', 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
277. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, § 5.7.
278. It has been argued that the political process provides a less effective safeguard in
the area of conditional spending because continued high levels of federal assistance are
generally of great importance to state and local governments. Thus, states may elect to
forego campaigning against certain conditions out of fear of hindering later efforts to
obtain federal funds. Rosenthal, supra note 242, at 1141. That theory assumes that our
nation's political process permits adverse ramifications. The Court in Garcia did leave
open the possibility that some extraordinary defect in a procedural aspect of the political
process may render congressional legislation invalid under the Tenth Amendment. 469
U.S. at 554. In South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988), the Court implied
that a state's allegation that it was deprived of any right to participate in the national
political process, or that it was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and
powerless, may constitute such a defect. A fear that participating in the process may
hinder later efforts to obtain funds does not rise to the level of the procedural defects
enunciated in Baker.
279. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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sters this conclusion. In that case the Court explained the constitu-
tionally permissible methods of encouraging states to conform to
federal policy under the Spending Clause.2", The Court found
that the ultimate decision to comply is bestowed upon the residents
of the state, rather than the state itself.'" Under our democratic
system bf government, a state's residents should determine whether
federal policy is sufficiently contrary to local interests to decline
participation in a federal program.28
Thus, that the conditional offer at issue may be invoked by
individual landowners rather than the state does not violate spend-
ing power limitations intended to protect state sovereignty. How-
ever, before concluding that a particular condition of a federal
spending program is constitutional, it is necessary to examine the
established limitations of enumerated powers other than the spend-
ing power to determine whether the bounds of federalism have
been overstepped." 3 As noted, a condition that LUREs acquired
by the federal government be perpetual also falls within the enu-
merated property power.2" Property power doctrine prescribes
some limitations intended to protect state sovereignty. Accordingly,
the issue becomes whether the property power provides an indepen-
dent constitutional bar sufficient to render the condition unconstitu-
tional under the fourth prong of the test set forth in Dole.
B. The Property Power Analysis
1. The Article I Propertyi Power
Congressional power over federal property and property inter-
ests derives from two sources in the Constitution: the Article I and
Article IV Property Clauses. Federal property interests acquired
under LURE provisions in the 1990 Farm Bill do not fall within
the scope of the Article I Property Clause. This clause provides
that Congress shall have the power:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District ... as may . . . become the Seat of the
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Au-
thority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
280. Id. at 2424.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards, and
other needful Buildings .... "'
Property covered by Article I is distinguished from other federal
property by its use and by state consent to its acquisition. The
phrase "other needful buildings" is very broad and has been con-
strued to encompass "whatever structures are found to be necessary
in the performance of the functions of the Federal Govern-
ment." 6 However, the Supreme Court has stated that the phrase
does not include tracts of federal land "used for forests, parks,
ranges, wild life sanctuaries, flood control, and other purposes
which are not covered by [Article I] Clause 17." "27 Accordingly,
even if a state cedes complete governmental jurisdiction over such
property to the United States,288 that property must be regarded
as falling under the Article IV clause alone.289
However, because the central issue is whether a particular
federal condition violates a limitation on the exercise of the proper-
ty power intended to protect state sovereignty, the concept of state
consent or cession of state legislative jurisdiction should be consid-
ered. Although a state's cession of legislative jurisdiction is regard-
ed as an integral aspect of the Article I property power,2 ° a state
may also cede legislative jurisdiction to the United States over
285. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
286. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 143 (1937).
287. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1938).
288. Cession of complete governmental jurisdiction is the essence of state consent under
the Article I Property Clause. For example, early cases held that the power conferred on
the United States under Article I to exercise exclusive legislation carries with it the power
of exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dravo Contracting, 302 U.S. at 141 (the United States
has the power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over land acquired under Article I); Unit-
ed States v. Comell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 653 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868) (state has no
jurisdiction over grounds of a fort located within its boundaries acquired by the United
States under Article I); cf. Reily v. Lamar, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344, 356-57 (1805) (resi-
dents of District of Columbia ceased to be residents of Maryland after Maryland ceded
the land to the United States). However, later cases found that Article I property does not
cease to be part of the state. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 426 (1970)
(holding that persons residing on Article I property in Maryland could not be denied the
right to vote in Maryland on ground that they were not residents of Maryland); Howard
v. Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624, 627 (1953) (holding that Article I
does not "prevent the state from exercising its power over the federal area within its
boundaries, so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Feder-
al Government").
289. Yosemite Park, 304 U.S. at 529-30.
290. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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property that does not fall under Article .291 Cession of legis-
lative jurisdiction to the United States would readily permit the
federal government to enact legislation that may otherwise exceed
limitations intended to protect state sovereignty.
Interestingly, the FLP, which expressly provides that perpetual
LUREs shall not be limited in duration by contrary state laws,2"
also contains a provision regarding state consent. The FLP pre-
scribes that if a state has not approved the acquisition of land
under section 515, LUREs shall not be acquired on lands outside
areas specifically designated as eligible for inclusion in the
FLP.29 Section 515 requires state consent before the Secretary
acquires lands necessary for timber production or to regulate the
flow of navigable waters.2' The FLP provision thus empowers
the Secretary to acquire LUREs under the program on lands ap-
proved for acquisition under section 515, as well as on lands eligi-
ble for inclusion in the FLP.
Further, the FLP directs that the establishment of eligibility
criteria and the subsequent selection of areas which may be en-
rolled in the FLP are to be performed by the Secretary "in consul-
tation" with state coordinating committees.295  Yet, the re-
sponsibilities of state coordinating committees are limited to "mak-
ing recommendations" to the Secretary concerning forest lands that
should be included in the FLP.2 Thus, although requiring coop-
eration between the federal government and the states, LUREs may
be acquired under the FLP without state consent or cession of state
jurisdiction.
Moreover, requiring state consent or cession of state jurisdic-
tion before acquiring LUREs pursuant to the many federal conser-
vation programs would hinder an important aspect of the programs
- the ability of the federal government to enter into voluntary
transactions with pivate landowners efficiently. Accordingly, it is
important to determine the constitutionality of a federal condition
that all LUREs be perpetual despite state law limitations on dura-
tion without reference to state consent.
291. Yosemite Park 304 U.S. at 528-30.
292. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(k) (Supp. H 1989).
293. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(g) (Supp. 11 1990).
294. 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1988).
295. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c(e) (Supp. ]I 1990).
296. Id. § 2113(b)(2)(D).
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2. The Article IV Property Power
The Article IV Property Clause provides: "Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States ... .297 Because it is recognized that the general lan-
guage of the Article IV Property Clause encompasses all property
owned by the United States, including personalty and intangible
property as well as interests in realty,29' federal property interests
acquired under LURE acquisition programs readily fall within the
scope of Article IV.
The purpose of the analysis in this subsection is to determine
whether any limitations on federal property power provide an inde-
pendent constitutional bar to a conditional offer of federal funds
under the spending power. One aspect of the analysis is whether
the legislation is within the enumerated property power: i.e., wheth-
er federal legislation authorizing enforceable, perpetual LUREs is a
needful rule or regulation respecting a property interest belonging
to the United States. The more refined issue for purposes of this
article, however, is whether such a conditional offer violates a
limitation on the exercise of the property power intended to protect
state sovereignty.
Initially, however, because of divergent views regarding the
"preemptive capability" of Article IV legislation, it is important to
determine the supremacy of legislation enacted pursuant to the
Article IV property power for the purpose of overriding contrary
state laws. If federal laws enacted under Article IV lack preemptive
capability, the federal condition requiring LUREs to be perpetual
would be rendered unconstitutional by an independent constitutional
bar making further analysis of the property power unnecessary.
a. The Supremacy of Article IV Legislation
The relative powers of the states and the federal government
over federal property have generated much controversy through the
297. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
298. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, 294
(holding that under Article IV Congress may regulate the selling of milk on federal lands
acquired under Article 1); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 331 (explaining that the
Article IV property power may be applied to regulate all personal and real property be-
longing to the United States); Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 137 n.80 (D.D.C.
1975) (stating that under Article IV only Congress can dispose of the President's docu-
ments, papers, tapes and other materials belonging to the United States).
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years. Scholars have asserted varying theories about the scope
of the Article IV property power.3w The polar views stem from
Supreme Court language noting that the power over federal proper-
ty entrusted to Congress is "without limitations."-3 1 At the same
time, other 'language implies that the powers of Congress over
federal lands are akin to the rights of an ordinary proprietor.2
Although the theories are diverse, the most relevant aspect of the
controversy is whether the legislative power of the federal govern-
ment over Article IV property is subordinate to state governmental
legislation.' °3 In other words, does a needful rule respecting fed-
eral property preempt state laws?
The divergent theories can be generally categorized as falling
into either a restrictive or a broad view of the Article IV property
power. Proponents of the restrictive view limit the role of Congress
over Article IV properties, with certain exceptions, to that of an
ordinary proprietor; accordingly, Article IV legislation can have no
299. In the 1930s, coastal states objected to newly asserted federal jurisdiction over
submerged lands over which the states had assumed ownership. Robert E. Hardwicke et
al., The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L REV. 398, 400-05 (1948).
More recently, western states have sought increased ownership of federal lands within
their boundaries. Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental
Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVrL. L 847, 848-49 (1982).
300. See, e.g., Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional
Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of Public Lands, 12 PAC. L1. 693 (1981) (propos-
ing that the federal government may not have a constitutional basis to control public
lands for other than enumerated purposes); David E. Engdahl, Federalism and Energy:
State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 AR1z. L. REV. 283 (1976) (tracing
the conceptual development of legislative jurisdiction over the various classes of federal
property); Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 617 (1985) (arguing that early precedents used by legal scholars to support a narrow
construction of the Property Clause really support the Court's current broad construction
of the Property Clause); Blake Shephard, The Scope of Congress' Constitutional Power
Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Power to Further the Purposes of
National Parks and Wilderness Areas, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFE. L. REV. 479, 533-38 (1984)
(concluding that the Property Clause is a plenary grant of authority to Congress and that
restraints upon the power should stem from the legislative process, not the courts); Louis
Touton, Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1980) (discussing the limits of federalism and the equal footing
doctrine on the federal government's power to regulate its land).
301. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
302. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v.
Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527 (1887).
303. Some scholars espouse an even more restrictive view - that the federal power
under Article IV prevents the federal government from retalning property within the
boundaries of the states except for Article I purposes. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 300,
at 719-22; C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories
and the States in Landholdings, 28 TEX. L REv. 43, 58 (1949).
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preemptive capability.3 4 Scholars espousing the broader view do
not differentiate the property power from other enumerated powers
and therefore advocate that a constitutional exercise of the Article
IV property power must preempt inconsistent state laws. °5
In the landmark case of Pollard v. Hagan,3° the Supreme
Court enunciated the parameters of Congress' power pursuant to
the Article IV Property Clause. Advocates of the restrictive view
herald Pollard as establishing that the United States is precluded
from exercising "general governmental jurisdiction" over federal
property within the boundaries of a state unless the federal proper-
ty constitutes Article I property.3' However, the broader view of
Pollard is that the Court did not construe the federal government's
powers under the Article IV Property Clause as subordinate.
Close analysis of Pollard reveals that the broader interpretation
is superior. That conclusion hinges on the Court's clarification of
its intent in rendering the decision: the Court stated that it was
"called upon to draw the line that separates the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of the government of the union, and the state govern-
ments, over the subject in controversy." 3m The subject in contro-
versy was land below the usual high water mark of a navigable
river in Alabama, shortly after Alabama had been admitted to the
Union. 3° The Court noted that the language of the Georgia deed
ceding the land to the United States was based on the doctrine of
equal footing31° - that the new state formed from the ceded
lands would be admitted to the Union with the same rights of
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain as the original
states.311 The Pollard case focused on the right of eminent do-
304. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 300, at 309-10.
305. See, e.g., Gaetke, supra note 300, at 656.
306. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
307. In other words, the United States is treated as having only limited power akin to
that of an ordinary property owner. See Engdahl, supra note 300, at 293-96.
308. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 220.
309. A central issue in Pollard was whether the land belonged to the state or the feder-
al government. If deemed -public land," the property would constitute Article IV property.
Id. at 224.
310. The doctrine of equal footing derives from the Ordinance of 1787, which provided
that the new states "shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United
States, on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever." Id. at 222.
Virginia and Georgia enacted legislation ceding lands to the federal government which
contained language to the same effect. Id. at 221-22.
311. Id. at 221-23. The doctrine of equal footing is an integral aspect of the restrictive
Property Clause theories. See supra note 300.
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main." The precise issue was whether the United States had the
right to transfer the land in controversy to the plaintiff through its
right of eminent domain.
The Court stated that, pursuant to agreements between the
ceding states and the United States, the United States had tempo-
rarily held "both national and municipal" right of eminent domain
over the lands ceded.313 The Court explained, however, that the
"municipal" right of eminent domain was held in trust only for the
new states.3 4 Even if a stipulation had been inserted in the
agreements which granted
the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to
the United States, such stipulation would have been void
and inoperative: because the United States have no consti-
tutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sover-
eignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or
elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly
granted.315
Thus, Pollard stands for the proposition that the United States has
no power to exercise "municipal" sovereignty over lands once
those lands are transferred to the new states.31 6
However, the Court recognized that not all lands ceded to the
United States would necessarily be transferred to new states. The
Court expressly stated that the new state, Alabama, succeeded to
all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain
which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, "except so far
as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the
possession and under the control of the United States." 317 As to
312. The Court defined eminent domain as the "right which belongs to the society, or
to the sovereign, of disposing, in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the
wealth contained in the state." Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
313. Id. at 222. The municipal right of eminent domain includes the power to dispose
of state lands for municipal purposes. Id. at 230. The national right of eminent domain
only extends to territories or properties of the federal government. Id. at 224.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 223.
316. Pollard distinguishes cases involving Article I property as -the only cases .. . in
which all the powers of government are united in a single government, except in the
cases already mentioned of the temporary territorial governments, and there a local gov-
ernment exists.- Id. at 223-24. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the United States
can exercise "municipal" sovereignty only over Article I property or over lands ceded to
the United States before those lands become new states.
317. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
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such "public lands" within the boundaries of the new state, the
Court expressly stated that the United States did not hold any
"municipal" sovereignty; rather, the United States possessed the full
power given to Congress "'to make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the territory or other property of the United
States." 318 In other words, the United States continued to hold
the power of "national" sovereignty.
Specifically, the Court held Alabama was entitled to sovereign-
ty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her limits to the
same extent that Georgia possessed it before it was ceded to the
United States.19 Under the common law at that time, each state
held the absolute right to all navigable waters and the soils under
them within the boundaries of the state, subject only to the rights
surrendered by the Constitution.32 Thus, the land in controversy
was not "public land," but belonged to Alabama. 321 Accordingly,
a clause in the agreement between Georgia and the United. States
which declared that "all navigable waters within the state shall for
ever [sic] remain public highways " 322 was deemed inoperative to
the extent that the clause attempted to create a right of eminent
domain in the United States for municipal purposes.3' Because
the challenged federal action was an attempt to transfer the proper-
ty to an individual citizen, it was deemed an exercise of eminent
domain for municipal purposes and was therefore void.2
318. Id. at 224 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3)
319. Id. at 228-29.
320. Id. at 229.
321. Because the land was not "public land," the Court held that "the right of the
United States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules
and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof (pursuant to Article IV, conferred no
power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy." Id. at 230. It is this aspect of
Pollard's holding which may be misunderstood by advocates of the restrictive view. For
example, Professor Engdahl's view can be construed as indicating that he believes that the
land in controversy in Pollard was "public land." See Engdahil, supra note 300, at 296.
322. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229.
323. The Court held that the transfer was void even though the United States could
have transferred the property via the commerce power. Id. at 229-30.
324. The Court aptly noted:
To give to the United States the right to transfer to a citizen the title to the
shores and the soils under the navigable waters, would be placing in their
hands a weapon which might be wielded greatly to the injury of state sover-
eignty, and deprive the States of the power to exercise a numerous and impor-
tant class of police powers. But in the hands of the States this power can
never be used so as to affect the exercise of any national right of eminent
domain or jurisdiction with which the United States have been invested by the
Constitution. For, although the territorial limits of Alabama have extended all
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Thus, Pollard does not support the restrictive theory that feder-
al legislation under the Article IV Property Clause is subordinate to
state laws. Rather, the case distinguishes federal power over lands
which become state property when new states are formed from
federal power over retained public lands within the boundaries of
new states: the federal government may not exercise "municipal
sovereignty" over lands which become state property, but may
exercise its Article IV property power over public lands within the
boundaries of new states.
Furthermore, later Supreme Court cases, especially the Court's
holding in the case of Kleppe v. New Mexico,325 seriously erode
the restrictive view. In Kleppe, the Court -stated that the "presence
or absence of [legislative] jurisdiction has nothing to do with
Congress' powers under the Property Clause." 326 Rather,
[a]bsent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Con-
gress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation
respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And
when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily
overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy
Clause.327
Therefore, the broader view of congressional authority under
the Article IV property power is more meritorious. Importantly,
however, this article does not attempt to resolve the conflicting
property power theories. Even proponents of the restrictive view
recognize certain exercises of the Article IV property power as
valid and capable of preemption. Since this article is concerned
with whether the property power is an independent constitutional
her sovereign power into the sea, it is there, as on the shore, but municipal
power, subject to the Constitution of the United States, "and the laws which
shall be made in pursuance thereof."
Id. at 230.
325. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
326. Id. at 542-43. Proponents of the restrictive view see Kleppe as an erroneous deci-
sion. For instance, Professor Engdahl asserts the Supreme Court failed to recognize that
the cases supporting the statement that the Property Clause power is a complete power
involved the "creation of rights in federal land by transfer of title, lease, or license, or
the validity of terms imposed by Congress as conditions of such grants." Engdahl, supra
note 300, at 352. However, the Court's express statement that the presence or absence of
legislative jurisdiction has nothing to do with the property power undermines the classic
Property Clause theory, and indicates that the distinction would have been irrelevant to
the Court's holding.
327. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543 (citations omitted).
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bar to an offer of federal funds subject to the condition that
LUREs be perpetual, it is sufficient to determine that: (i) the fed-
eral condition falls within the sphere of recognized preemptive
Article IV power; and (ii) the federal condition does not overstep
limitations intended to protect state sovereignty.
b. The Preemptive Exercises of Article IV Property Power
The Article IV Property Clause empowers Congress to regulate
without limitation the disposition of interests in federal proper-
ty.31 Congress has an absolute right to prescribe the times, con-
ditions, and mode of transferring interests in federal property, and
to designate to whom the transfer shall be made.329 This power is
largely attributable to the express language of Article IV which
contains no limitations regarding Congress' power to "dispose of"
331
federal property.a3 Such power is akin to that held by any pro-
prietor.
331
However, congressional power also goes beyond that of an
ordinary proprietor. Cases have held that state statutes of limitation,
as well as state laws creating or disregarding equitable or inchoate
rights, may be vitiated to the extent necessary to validate a convey-
ance by the federal government.332 In addition, Congress may
subject a conveyance of Article IV property to terms or conditions
not otherwise permitted under state law.3 Thus, Congress may
readily promote policies not related to the federal property itself by
328. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1871).
329. Id.; see also Eugene R. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Property
Clause, 33 HASTiNrs L. 381, 384 (1981) (explaining that "[l]ike other proprietors, Con-
gress may decide whether, when and on what terms to dispose of [federal] lands").
330. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
331. Judicial deference to congressional judgment regarding the disposition of federal
property is a necessary consequence of the proprietary nature of such decisions. Gaetke,
supra note 329, at 391.
332. See, e.g., Gibson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 103-04 (holding that occupation of land
for period of time established by state law is not sufficient to defeat legal title subse-
quently conveyed to others by the United States); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
498, 516 (1839) (asserting that state law deeming inchoate or imperfect title denied -per-
fect title as if a patent had issued" cannot defeat later conveyance by United States).
However, the cases indicate that state laws may be vitiated only to the extent necessary
to validate the conveyance.
333. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 633 (1989) (when a state re-
ceives title to land previously held by the. federal government, the state must use or trans-
fer the land subject to any conditions attached to the transfer by the federal government);
Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1879) (once title to public lands passes
under federal laws, it is subject to state legislation only so far as that legislation is con-
sistent with the vesting of title provided by federal laws).
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inserting conditions in grants or other dispositions of the proper-
ty.
3 34
Congress also may enact preemptive Article IV legislation to
regulate conduct on both federal and non-federal property in order
to protect federal property from harm.135 This represents an en-
largement of the federal government's proprietary power 3 All
owners may invoke available remedies to protect their land, but the
federal government can go further by legislatively creating reme-
dies from potential harms. For example, the Court has upheld
federal legislation that permitted killing deer threatening federal
property even though state game laws prohibited such killings.337
Additionally, Article IV legislation is recognized as supreme
where federal property is used to effectuate an enumerated pow-
er.33 1 Even proponents of the restrictive view acknowledge this as
a necessary consequence of federal authority conferred by the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause.339 The Necessary and Proper Clause
justifies the federal government's right of eminent domain, which
may be invoked to acquire property necessary to further the
government's delegated powers.'
Finally, Congress may enact preemptive Article IV legislation
to promote its policies regarding the use of the federal proper-
ty." Under Article IV, Congress may designate federal proper-
334. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30
(upholding a federal land grant to a city for water supply and for generating electricity
conditioned on the requirement that all energy be sold to consumers rather than private
utility companies) (1940).
335. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) (upholding a federal
statute authorizing killing of deer on federal property when the deer population threatened
the federal property notwithstanding state game laws restricting the killing of deer); United
States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927) (upholding a federal law punishing one who
built and failed to extinguish a fire on private land which endangered federal lands);
McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922) (holding that Congress may prohib-
it conduct on federal land); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897) (uphold-
ing a federal law forbidding enclosure of public land as a valid prohibition against build-
ing fences on non-federal land).
336. Engdahl, supra note 300, at 308-09.
337. Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100.
338. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 530 (1885) (Federal properties,
"as instrumentalities for the execution of [federal] power, will be free from any such
interference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or impair their effective use for
the purposes designed.").
339. Engdahl, supra note 300, at 299-300.
340. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875).
341. Gaetke, supra note 329, at 387. The Supreme Court has upheld legislation regu-
lating conduct on federal and non-federal property as a means of promoting federal land
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ties as national forests or parks, wilderness areas and wildlife ref-
uges, and Congress may enact legislation to effectuate these land
use policies.' " For instance, in the case of Minnesota v. United
States, 3 federal legislation prohibiting the use of motorboats and
snowmobiles on certain lands and waters not owned by the federal
government was upheld because the legislation reasonably related
to protecting federal land reserved for wilderness.3'
The breadth of the property power is illustrated by Kleppe v.
New Mexico.3 5 In Kleppe, the Court upheld legislation autho-
rizing federal agencies to protect and manage wild horses and
burros on federal lands.3" The Court sustained Congress' deter-
mination that the legislation was a "needful" regulation "respecting"
federal property without finding that the animals themselves were
federal property or that the legislation was necessary to protect the
federal land from harm.347 Rather, the Court reiterated the view
that Congress' power under Article IV, at least as to "public
lands," is without limitations.3' The Court held that Congress'
power under the Article IV Property Clause necessarily includes
the power to regulate and protect wildlife living on the proper-
ty.
34 9
On the other hand, there are potential limits on the federal
property power that protect state sovereignty. In United States v.
City & County of San Francisco,3s° the Court indicated that the
use polices. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (upholding fed-
eral legislation protecting wild horses and burros that set foot on federal lands at any
time); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897) (upholding federal law forbid-
ding fences on non-federal property which would enclose public lands).
342. See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1938) (holding
the federal government may acquire state land for national parks and exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over such lands, except as reserved to the state by the terms of the convey-
ance); Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 206-09 (1937)
(holding the federal government may acquire property to reclaim ard and semi-arid lands,
provided the property is subject to state jurisdiction in accordance with agreement between
the state and federal governments); see also Gaetke, supra note 329, at 387 (reviewing
legislation enacted to protect federal land designated as national forests, parks, wilderness
areas or wildlife refuges).
343. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
344. Id. at 1250-51.
345. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
346. Id. at 546 (upholding the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act §§ 1-10, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988)).
347. 426 U.S. at 536-37.
348. Id. at 539.
349. Id. at 541.
350. 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (quoted with approval in Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540).
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property power does not authorize "an exercise of a general control
over public policy in a State."351 In that case, Califorma chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a land grant and certain rights of
way which included a condition prohibiting the state from selling
to private utilities hydroelectric power generated on the land.352
The condition was challenged as an attempt to regulate the disposi-
tion of electricity in San Francisco.
353
The Court found that the congressional policy underlying the
legislation - the avoidance of monopolies to help keep power
rates low for consumers - did not represent an exercise of general
control over public policy in a state. Instead, the Court found the
legislation was an exercise of the complete power which Congress
has over particular federal property 3 4 The case thus sheds light
on the possible parameters of the property power. The avoidance of
monopolies for the benefit of consumers is an area in which the
federal government has long been active. Congressional policies
underlying such legislation are national in scope and do not affect
a state's general public policy; they only affect a particular aspect
of a state's public policy as reflected in its laws.
An additional limitation on the federal government's power
under the Article IV Property Clause was noted by the Supreme
Court in Ashwander v. TVA. 355 The Court in Ashwander stated
that the federal government's power to dispose of federal property
"must be consistent with the foundational principles of the dual
system of government and must not be contrived to govern the
concerns reserved to the States." 3- As this article has noted, the
Supreme Court subsequently rejected the notions of dual federalism
and discrete areas reserved for state control.357 Nevertheless, the
case supports the premise that incidents of state sovereignty are
accorded protection through limitations on the federal property
power.
351. Id. at 30.
352. Id. at 18-19.
353. Id. at 28.
354. Id. at 30.
355. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
356. Id. at 338. Disposal of federal property must also be appropriate to the nature of
the property and in the public interest Id.
357. See supra notes 245, 275-76 and accompanying text.
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c. Analysis of LURE Programs Under Preemptive Property
Power
This article will now determine whether a federal condition
requiring LUREs acquired under federal conservation programs to
be perpetual is capable of preemption. Further, this section will
determine whether such a federal rule oversteps limitations intended
to protect state sovereignty, succumbing to the "independent consti-
tutional bar" prong of the Dole test.
358
Conservation programs using LUREs capture the essence of the
Article IV power which the federal government would have over
the land if it acquired the lands in fee. Conditions restricting cer-
tain land uses and requiring restorations or conservation plans
would readily fall within the scope of the property power because
they constitute regulations of conduct to protect the federal proper-
ty from harm. However, for the Property Clause analysis it is
crucial to note that the federal property interest in a LURE is the
right to enforce the terms of the LURE. In particular, it is the right
to enforce a perpetual LURE despite state law limitations on dura-
tion.
The FmHA provision mandating establishment of perpetual
LUREs on wetlands in FmHA inventories 359 falls within the cate-
gory of Article IV property power capable of preemption. Because
the federal government holds fee title, encumbering such lands with
a perpetual LURE constitutes a regulation of conduct on the land
to protect the federal property. Moreover, any disposition of a
LURE3 ° created pursuant to the provision falls within Congress'
broad power to choose the terms and conditions in disposing of
federal property.
The other federal agriculture programs using LUREs - the
CRP, WRP, EEP, FLP, RECP, and the FmHA debt-restructuring
program - authorize the federal government to acquire LUREs
from individual landowners."6 It is not readily clear that the use
358. See supra notes 256, 259-70 and accompanying text.
359. 7 U.S.C. § 1985(g)(1) (Supp. H 1990).
360. Id. § 1985(c)(1). The FmHA provisions expressly authorize the government to
transfer perpetual LUREs to state or private non-profit entities. Id.; see supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
361. See discussion supra part I.B.2. The Farms Act and the Watershed program,
through which approved state or private non-profit entities acquire the LUREs and the
federal government merely offers assistance, do not readily fall within the scope of the
property power. Because these programs require the entities acquiring the LUREs to prove
that the LUREs will be valid and enforceable perpetual LUREs, these programs are limit-
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of the federal condition in these programs would be capable of
preemption. The issue is whether Congress can legislate that the
federal government, as an ordinary proprietor in a voluntary trans-
action with an individual landowner, may acquire a property right
that is not a cognizable aspect of the landowner's "bundle of
rights" under state law.
Federal legislation requiring LUREs to be perpetual despite
state law limitations on duration effectuates the specific congressio-
nal policy of attaining long-term conservation goals. Assuring long-
term enforceability of LUREs held by the federal government pro-
tects the federal property interest and effectuates the land use poli-
cies underlying the LURE acquisition programs. However, the
exercise of preemptive property power relating to the protection of
federal property derives from cases where conduct affecting federal
property was regulated. Preemptive property power relating to the
effectuation of congressional policies generally derives from federal
rules affecting the use of federal property.
A federal condition that LUREs acquired under conservation
programs be perpetual is not a regulation of conduct, nor a rule
affecting the use of federal property. Furthermore, federal legisla-
tion allowing the federal government to acquire enforceable perpet-
ual LUREs does not fall within the authority to dispose of federal
property. Nevertheless, close examination of case law reveals that
federal acquisition of enforceable, perpetual LUREs from individual
landowners is capable of preemption.
In United States v. Albrecht,362 a federal LURE acquired
from a landowner in North Dakota pursuant to a federal conser-
vation program was valid despite state law which presumably did
not recognize that type of property interest.363 Because the LURE
effectuated an important national concern, the court held that it
should not be defeated by state law.36 The court noted that to
hold otherwise would permit states to rely on local laws to defeat
the acquisition of reasonable property rights and to destroy an
important national program. 36 However, since the court did not
ed to states which do not have laws precluding perpetual LUREs. Therefore, these pro-
grams do not raise property power issues. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
362. 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974). See infra notes 430-37 and accompanying text for a
more detailed analysis of Albrecht.
363. Id. at 911.
364. Id.
365. Id. The program authorized the United States to acquire interests in wetlands and
potholes to aid the breeding of migratory birds. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
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engage in a property power analysis, the case only provides implic-
it support for the proposition that the federal acquisition was a
constitutional exercise of Article IV property power.
Explicit support can be gleaned from case law, but only via a
meandering avenue beginning with the case of North Dakota v.
United States.3 1 In North Dakota, the federal government had
acquired LUREs over wetlands for protection of migratory water-
fowl. 367 The Supreme Court stated that the United States is au-
thorized to incorporate into such LURE agreements rules and regu-
lations that the Secretary of the Interior deems necessary to protect
wildlife, including restrictions on land outside the legal description
of the LURE itself.36 The Court noted that as long as North Da-
kota landowners were willing to negotiate agreements, the agree-
ments could not be abrogated by state law.369 As discussed in the
next section, the holding in North Dakota is expressly limited to
LURE agreements entered into by the federal government before
enactment of state laws which could defeat the purpose of the
federal program. Thus, the case is not authority for the notion that
the federal government may negotiate terms and thereby acquire a
property right not recognized or precluded by existing state
law.
370
However, in a footnote,3 7' the Court cited the earlier case of
United States v. Burnison.3 2 The Burnison Court held that a state
may control and prohibit the testamentaiy transfer of property to
the United States but clarified that its holding would "not affect
the right of the United States to acquire property by purchase or
eminent domain in the face of a prohibitory statute of the
state."373 The Burnison Court justified its distinction by explain-
text.
366. 460 U.S. 300 (1983).
367. Id. at 305.
368. Id. at 319 (citing Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S.
518, 525-26 (1897)). The non-federal lands involved in the case were after-expanded
wetlands. Id.
369. Id.
370. See infra notes 417-29 and accompanying text.
371. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 319 n.22.
372. 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
373. Id. at 93 n.14 (citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1985)) (emphasis add-
ed). The Burnison Court expressly declined the opportunity to overrule United States v.
Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876). 339 U.S. at 93. In Fox, the Court held that the disposition of
immovable property, whether by deed, descent or any other means is subject to the exclu-
sive control of the government of the state where the property is situated. Fox, 94 U.S.
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ing that the legal concept of a transfer of property may be separat-
ed into a series of steps, including the acts of giving, receiving,
and purchasing, and that a party's particular role in the transaction
may determine its legal consequences.374
Burnison discusses a state's ability to control its domiciliaries'
power to give and the United States' corresponding power to re-
ceive.375 The case held that state laws may preclude a transfer of
property to the United States where the United States is merely
receiving the property.376 Furthermore, citing Kohl v. United
States,3" Burnison expressly distinguished the situation where the
federal government exercises its power to acquire by purchase or
eminent domain.37 In Kohl, the Supreme Court held that the
powers vested by the Constitution in the federal government nec-
essarily entail the ability to acquire lands in the United States,
explaining that:
If the right to acquire property for such uses may be made
a barren right by the unwillingness of property-holders to
sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to the
Federal government, the constitutional grants of power may
be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for
its practical existence upon the will of a State, or even
upon that of a private citizen.379
Thus, the Court upheld the federal government's right of eminent
domain as a necessary and proper means to effectuate the powers
conferred by the Constitution.
Similarly, as recognized by the Court in Burnison and North
Dakota, the right of the federal government to acquire a real prop-
erty interest by negotiated purchase may also constitute a necessary
and proper means to effectuate an enumerated power. Thus, be-
cause an exercise of Article IV property power in conjunction with
the Necessary and Proper Clause is within the sphere of property
at 320-21.
374. Burnison, 339 U.S. at 91.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 93. It is noteworthy, however, that Burnison and Fox involved testamentary
dispositions of property. The Supreme Court's positions in the cases may have been influ-
enced by the fact that the states would have been unable to collect inheritance taxes from
the United States if the devises had been upheld.
377. 91 U.S. 367.
378. Burnison, 339 U.S. at 93 n.14; Fox, 94 U.S. at 320.
379. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371.
380. Id. at 372.
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power legislation that has preemptive capability, the question be-
comes whether federal acquisition of an enforceable, perpetual
LURE is a proper exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Necessary and Proper Clause311 confers upon Congress:
(1) the power to legislate through a means outside the scope of
any of the other enumerated powers to effectuate an enumerated
power; or (2) the power to attain an extraneous end so long as the
means bears a relationship to the effectuation of an enumerated
power.382 However, Congress' election to use the necessary and
proper power must have a rational basis 38 3 and the effectuation of
the enumerated power must be substantial.3
The primary end achieved by a condition requiring LUREs
acquired under federal conservation programs to be perpetual is
long-term protection of environmentally significant aspects of the
land resource. Environmentally sensitive lands directly, or at least
indirectly, affect interstate commerce by virtue of their maintenance
of the ecosystems which generate marketable products and hence
interstate movement.3 - Long-term protection of environmentally
important lands, such as highly erodible lands, farmland and non-
federal forest lands, is crucial to the ability of the agricultural and
forestry industries to meet the long-term demands of future mar-
kets. Thus, a condition that LUREs be perpetual substantially effec-
tuates congressional Commerce Clause policies.
Although a modest standard, the rational basis test requires the
government to choose means reasonably related to its ends.387
Given our country's experience with the consequences of environ-
mental degradation, including degradation of the land resource, it is
rational to conclude that long-term protection of environmentally
sensitive lands is critical to the ability of the agricultural and for-
estry industries to meet the demands of future markets. Further,
much of the testimony in congressional hearings on the conserva-
tion provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill advocated using perpetual
381. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
382. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
383. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964).
384. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119-20 (1941).
385. See supra note 240.
386. Furthermore, the ends clearly promote the general welfare of our country, which
may be deemed an extraneous end. However, because the means also bear a relationship
to the effectuation of the commerce power, the Necessary and Proper Clause may be used
to attain the extraneous end.
387. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261-62.
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LUREs to attain federal conservation and preservation objec-
tives."' Thus, Congress has a rational basis to condition LURE
acquisitions on a perpetuity requirement.
Because conditional LURE acquisition has a rational basis, it is
a proper exercise of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Therefore,
federal legislation authorizing the federal government to acquire a
property right that is not a cognizable aspect of the landowner's
bundle of rights under state law in a voluntary transaction with an
individual landowner falls within the category of Article IV prop-
erty power capable of preemption.
The second level of inquiry is whether the federal condition
oversteps limitations intended to protect state sovereignty. As ex-
plained, property power doctrine does not authorize "an exercise of
general control over public policy in a state."38 9 Because a state's
property law reflects its public policy, a condition in a federal
conservation program requiring LUREs to be enforceable in perpe-
tuity may be contrary to state public policy - especially where the
federal government has conveyed the right to enforce the LURE to
private, nonprofit entities. However, congressional policies underly-
ing federal conservation legislation are national in scope and poten-
tially affect only a particular aspect of a state's public policy.
Applying the rationale set forth in United States v. City and Coun-
ty of San Francisco,3 ° such a federal condition does not suffi-
ciently affect a state's public policy to cast it into a potential limi-
tation on the property power.
ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish39' supports this conclusion. In
ASARCO, the Supreme Court enforced conditions imposed through
the disposition of a federal land grant to a state.3' The case in-
volved the grant of federal land to Arizona to be held in trust for
public schools. 393 The federal enabling legislation directed that
the lands could only be sold or leased in accordance with federal
advertising, bidding and appraisal conditions. 394 Nevertheless, Ari-
zona granted mineral leases in violation of the federal directive.
Individual taxpayers and the Arizona Education Association brought
388. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
389. United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940).
390. Id; see supra notes 350-54 and accompanying text.
391. 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
392. Id. at 625-33.
393. Id. at 626.
394. Id. at 627.
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suit. s95 The Supreme Court held the state statute void, enforcing
the rights created by the conditional grant against the grantees even
though state laws directed otherwise."
ASARCO is instructive because the Arizona law reflected state
public policy in an area of property law - mineral leases. The
Court upheld federal legislation which imposed a more restrictive
public policy to protect the purpose of the federal land grant, even
though the federal law hindered the alienability of interests in real
property. By analogy, state laws precluding perpetuity or assign-
ability of LUREs reflect a state's public policy in an area of prop-
erty law. A federal condition that LUREs be perpetual even when
conveyed to third parties would impose a less restrictive policy to
protect the conservation purpose of the LURE. Although the feder-
al legislation arguably hinders free transferability of an interest in
real property, both ASARCO and United States v. City & County of
San Francisco indicate that the enforceability of LUREs in perpetu-
ity would not overstep property power limitations protecting state
sovereignty.
C. Application to the Spending Power Analysis
A federal condition requiring LUREs acquired under federal
conservation programs to be perpetual and preemptive of contrary
state law limitations on duration is within the scope of the Article
IV property power. Further, this exercise of preemptive power
under Article IV does not violate constitutional limitations intended
to protect state sovereignty. Accordingly, a federal conservation
program which subjects the offer of federal funds in exchange for
a LURE to a condition requiring the LURE to be perpetual is a
constitutional exercise of the federal property power. Therefore,
federal property power doctrine does not provide an independent
constitutional bar sufficient to render the condition an unconstitu-
tional exercise of the spending power under the fourth prong of the
Dole test.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION PERMITTING PERPETUAL LURES WIL
RESULT IN BETTER CONSERVATION POLICY
Federal legislation authorizing enforceable, perpetual LUREs
395. Id. at 610. ASARCO and other mineral lessees of the state school lands intervened
in the action as defendants. Id.
396. d at 633.
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despite state law limitations on duration raises important public
policy concerns. Because a federal directive to acquire perpetual
LUREs is a proper exercise of congressional powers, and because
the incorporation of state law may hinder federal conservation
policies, Congress could easily conclude that a federal directive is
the better policy choice. However, even if authorizing enforceable,
perpetual LUREs does not intrude on state sovereignty, Congress
should engage in a thoughtful decisionmaking process before en-
acting legislation which preempts traditional areas of state control.
Under the Supreme Court's holding in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,3" a deliberate process of federal
decisionmaking is a critical aspect of Tenth Amendment protec-
tion.398 Accordingly, by identifying the relevant policy factors,
this article develops and applies a framework for the policy deci-
sion.
Whether federal or state law should govern LURE duration is
analogous to the question a federal court would address if asked to
interpret LUREs under federal programs which do not specify the
governing law. Such programs include the MBCA, the RECP, and
the FniHA LURE provisions of the CRP.31 Thus, this article re-
views analogous federal cases to glean the relevant policy consider-
ations and to provide a guide for courts in considering LUREs
under federal programs that do not specify the governing law. A
framework founded upon the judicial process should ensure that
policy questions are fairly and reasonably considered.
A. The Judicial Framework for the Policy Decision
Before the 1990 Farm Bill, LURE provisions in federal conser-
vation legislation did not dictate whether state or federal law
should determine the permissible duration of LUREs held by the
federal government.' Scholars have noted the presence and sig-
nificance of the resulting choice-of-law issue." These scholars
397. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
398. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 58-59, 67-73, 83-93 and accompanying text.
400. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 715a, 715d, 1501 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (providing ex-
amples of LURE provisions which do not prescribe whether federal or state law should
govern).
401. See, e.g., Janet L. Madden, Tax Incentives for Land Conservation: The Charitable
Contribution Deduction for Gifts of Conservation Easements, 11 B.C. ENvrX. AFF. L.
REV. 105, 119-20 (1983) (noting that state common law hostility toward conservation
easements has yielded to developing support for such easements in federal property law);
Ross D. Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through Re-
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have generally concluded that the federal common law of real
property should govern the interpretation of LUREs because an
"aberrant or hostile" state law will generally not defeat a federal
land acquisition program.' While adhering to the "aberrant or
hostile" rule, federal courts also engage in a more refined analysis
to determine whether to incorporate state law.
Where Congress has appropriately exercised its power but
failed. to specify whether federal or state law should apply, the
resulting choice-of-law question may be properly resolved by the
federal courts.4 3 In effect, there is an exception to the Erie doc-
trine4  when the issue involves the operation of a congressional
program.405 Because issues relating to the operation of a federal
program are within the competence of the federal judiciary, state
law is not necessarily controlling.406 Rather, in exercising the
corded Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 540, 558 (1979) (noting
development in federal law limiting state rules regarding assignability and enforceability).
402. See, e.g., Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Authority for Federal Acquisition of Conserva-
tion Easements to Provide Agricultural Credit Relief, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 477, 510 (1985-
86) (arguing that federal law should override state law governing easements under the Ag-
ricultural Land Trust due to the strong federal policy to promote soil conservation and
land preservation).
403. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 590-93
(1973) (when the United States is party to a land acquisition that arises from or bears
heavily upon a federal program, the federal courts may decide the choice-of-law question);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (stating that when there
is no applicable act of Congress, the federal courts must decide the governing rule of
law).
404. The Erie doctrine derives from the Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie stands for the proposition that federal courts must
apply state law where the subject matter involved is beyond the federal courts' law-mak-
ing competence. Id. at 78.
405. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law: Competence and Discre-
tion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797,
799 (1957) ("[I]nsofar as Erie represents authority for the required application of state law
by federal courts, it is not controlling on problems implicated in the operation of a con-
gressional program.").
406. Id. at 799; see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Com-
mon Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 883 (1986) (arguing that the power to create federal'
common law is very broad and that state law is rarely applied of its own force); Alfred
Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1038 (1967) (stating that in cases where the United States has a
proprietary interest, there is a constitutional basis for federal preemption). Due to inherent
defects in the legislative process, "effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power
in the federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law or 'judicial legislation,* rules
which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate statutory patterns
enacted in the large by Congress." Mishkin, supra note 405, at 800; see also Clearfield
Trust, 318 U.S. at 366-67 (stating that law-making competence of federal courts is implic-
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choice-of-law task, a federal court may choose a federally created
substantive rule as the governing law. 4 Alternatively, the court
may adopt state law as the governing rule by incorporating state
law into the federal law.'
In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Company,' the
Supreme Court applied this choice-of-law process to a federal land
acquisition program. The, Court stated that the law controlling the
acquisition and transfer of property, and defining the rights of its
owners, is generally the law of the state where the property is
located.4" However, where local transactions involve the federal
government and raise serious questions of national sovereignty, a
federal court must decide whether to "borrow" state law.411 To
resolve the question, a court' must examine "a variety of consider-
ations always relevant to -the nature of the specific governmental
interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law." 412
Yet the Court noted that "specific aberrant or hostile" state laws
should not be applied.413 Determining whether a state law is ab-
errant or hostile to the federal program is thus a component of the
analysis to determine whether state law should be incorporated.
Since an affirmative answer to this sub-question averts the need to
continue the analysis, determining whether state law is aberrant or
hostile is an appropriate point of departure. Because federal LUREs
it in the Constitution).
407. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366-67 (finding a federal rule appropriate to
determine the rights of the United States against the endorser of a federal check); Deitrick
v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940) (creating a federal rule for deternining the
availability of defenses under the National Bank Act).
408. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (incorporating state
law to determine whether illegitimate children qualify as "children" under the Copyright
Act); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1946) (incorpo-
rating state definition of "real property" to interpret provision of the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation Act subjecting government property to local taxes). The -discretionary"
incorporation of state law is distinguishable from an application of state law pursuant to
the Erie doctrine. The decision to incorporate state law permits the federal court to con-
trol .the extent of the state law which will be incorporated, in this manner, the court may
limit the application of state law to a single narrow issue. Mishkin, supra note 405, at
805. More importantly, in contrast to application of the Erie doctrine, the substance of the
applicable state rule is a relevant fact. Id.; see also United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1947) (recognizing that state law is either governed by Erie or
chosen to fulfill federal policy).
409. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
410. Id. at 591.
411. Id. at 592-93.
412. Id. at 595.
413. Id. at 595-96.
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promote an important national concern, the analysis must focus on
the state law's effects on federal conservation programs.
Several cases have analyzed whether a particular state law is
aberrant or hostile to a federal land program. In Little Lake Misere,
the government acquired fee title to lands pursuant to the Migrato-
ry Bird Conservation Act.414 The terms of the acquisition permit-
ted the United States to extinguish certain mineral reservations
encumbering the acquired lands after ten years.415 However, after
the transfer but before the ten years had expired, the state enacted
a statute which would prevent the United States from extinguishing
the mineral rights. Since retroactive application of the state law
would deprive the United States of its contractual interests, the
Court found the state law "plainly hostile" to the federal pro-
gran.
416
In North Dakota v. United States,417 the federal government
acquired easements pursuant to the Migratory Bird, Hunting, and
Stamp Act ("MBHSA") on wetlands used for waterfowl breeding
and nesting.418 The MBHSA requires such acquisitions to be ap-
proved by the governor of the state or an appropriate state agen-
cy.419 Although the Governor of North Dakota had given his con-
sent, the state later enacted legislation requiring the Governor to
submit MBHSA land acquisition proposals for approval by local
county commissioners.420 The legislation also authorized landown-
ers to drain after-expanded wetlands exceeding the legal descrip-
tions in the easement agreements and limited all easements to
ninety-nine years.42 1
The Supreme Court upheld the requirement that proposals be
submitted to county commissioners.4 2 This requirement was not
414. Id. at 582-84.
415. Id. at 582-83.
416. Id. at 597. Although the United States urged the Court to decide that land acqui-
sition programs should be governed by federal law without qualification, the Court de-
clined to resolve the question on such broad terms. id. at 595. The Court noted that its
decision might change if the Louisiana statute served legitimate and important state inter-
ests which Congress might have contemplated. Id. at 599.
417. 460 U.S. 300 (1983).
418. Id. at 304-305.
419. Id. at 303.
420. Id. at 306-308.
421. Id.
422. Although not considering the question of consent to future acquisitions, the Court
noted that state conditions on consent to federal jurisdiction over land are constitutionally
permfitted. See id. at 316 n.20 (citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,
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hostile to the federal legislation because the MBHSA expressly
required state approval and because the state law did not apply
retroactively to the consent granted by North Dakota's gover-
nor.423 However, because the easement agreements previously
executed by the United States prohibited draining after-expanded
wetlands, the Court deemed the state's new provision authorizing
draining an attempt to abrogate terms already expressly negotiated
by the United States.44 Following Little Lake Misere, the Court
found the provision hostile to the federal program.4z
Finally, the Court held that the provision limiting easements to
ninety-nine years could not retroactively abrogate easement terms
previously negotiated by the United States.426 However, the Court
did not consider whether the limitation could be applied to future
agreements. 427 Thus, the Court did not address whether prospec-
tive application of the law would be deemed hostile to the federal
program-42 Nonetheless, the Court did acknowledge that the fed-
eral commitment to protect migratory birds would not terminate in
ninety-nine years.429
The holdings of the Supreme Court decisions are necessarily
limited. The cases indicate that state law should not be incorporat-
ed where it would function retroactively to abrogate agreements
negotiated by the United States which were valid when executed.
The Court's holdings do not indicate whether state law limitations
on duration with prospective operation will also be circumscribed.
Lower federal court decisions, on the other hand, have expand-
ed the concept of what constitutes a hostile state law. In United
States v. Albrecht,43° a landowner disputed the validity of a fed-
eral LURE granted by the previous owner under a small wetlands
acquisition program.431 The landowner argued that North Dakota
146-47 (1937)).
423. Id. it 316-17.
424. Id. at 319.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 320.
427. Id. at 320 n.24.
428. l
429. Id. at 320. -To ensure that essential habitats will remain protected, the United
States has adopted the practice of acquiring permanent easements whenever possible.- Id.
In addition, the Court noted that the state law was enacted in response to discontent over
the amount of lands encumbered by permanent easements. Id. at 320 n.23.
430. 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
431. Id. at 909-10; see supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the federal
program).
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law only recognized interests in realty created by statute and that
no state statute authorized a LURE of the type conveyed to the
United States.432 Thus the federal government could not have ac-
quired the disputed LURE.433 For purposes of the analysis, the
court assumed that state law did not recognize LURES.43 How-
ever, because the LURE effectuated an important national concern,
the court held that, despite its label, the agreement should not be
defeated.435 To hold otherwise would have permitted states to use
local laws to defeat federal property rights and destroy important
national programs.43 Thus, the Albrecht court expanded the con-
cept of hostile state laws to include laws in existence at the time
of conveyance if they would invalidate the conveyance itself.437
In Sierra Club v. Marsh,43 a private developer agreed to
convey land to the United States as mitigation for a public works
project by the Army Corps of Engineers.439 The land was adja-
cent to Chula Vista, California.44° Chula Vista impeded the pro-
posed conveyance by requiring the developer to reserve seven
easements in favor of Chula Vista across the mitigation land.441
The Army Corps and the Fish and Wildlife Service contended that
the conditions substantially diminished the use of the acreage as
mitigation land." 2 Characterizing Chula Vista's efforts as "an at-
tempt to stymie any transfer of the property which . . . does not
serve the City's interests," the court held the state law was hostile
to a federal program of national scope and did not require the
United States to comply with the local permit process." 3 Thus,
Sierra Club expanded the concept of a hostile state law to include
prospective application of local laws affecting conveyances not yet
consummated. This expansion applies to local laws which abrogate
432. Albrecht, 496 F.2d at 909.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 911.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. C'We, therefore, specifically hold that the property right conveyed to the United
States in this case, whether or not deemed a valid easement or other property right under
North Dakota law, was a valid conveyance under federal law and vested in the United
States the rights as stated therein.").
438. 692 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
439. Id. at 1212-13.
440. Id. at 1212.
441. Id. at 1213.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1214-15.
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or invalidate the conveyance, as well as laws which impede a
federal program by imposing conditions limiting the usefulness of
the acquisition. 4
The lower court holdings do not conclusively resolve whether a
state law precluding perpetual LUREs is hostile or aberrant to
federal conservation programs. Under the Supreme Court cases, a
court should not incorporate a state law which would result in
retroactive abrogation of the LURE itself or which would eliminate
an expressly negotiated term requiring the LURE to be perpetual.
However, even under the expanded view expressed by the Eighth
Circuit in Albrecht, a state law precluding the enforcement of per-
petual LUREs is not clearly hostile. Albrecht's holding only en-
compasses state laws existing at the time of the acquisition which
would invalidate the conveyance. A law which limits the duration
of a LURE does not invalidate or abrogate the conveyance itself;
rather, it only affects the period of time over which the LURE
may be enforced.
This distinction was recognized in Cortese v. United States.445
In Cortese, the federal government had acquired restrictions limit-
ing the commercial and residential development of land. Under
state law, the interest constituted a restrictive covenant, but the
federal government argued that the restrictions created an easement
and were thus permanent. However, the court found the state law
was not hostile"5 even though characterizing the interest as a
covenant threatened its permanency through possible application of
the equitable doctrine of changed circumstances." 7
Only the holding of Sierra Club can be construed as fully
supporting the proposition that state laws precluding perpetual
LUREs are hostile and should not be incorporated. State laws
preventing the enforcement of LUREs in perpetuity clearly impede
or limit the usefulness of the government's acquisition. Since a
district court's analysis is not controlling, however, it cannot be
concluded definitively that a state law limitation on the duration of
444. See Id. at 1215 ("lit is clear that the City would not grant the United States the
permit it seeks, or if it did do so, would condition its issuance on terns which would
render the acquisition meaningless.").
445. 782 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1986).
446. Id. at 849. The court expressly distinguished Lite Lake Misere and Albrecht be-
cause Cortese did not involve a program of national scope. Id.
447. "The doctrine of changed circumstances ... stays enforcement of unreasonably
burdensome restrictions on land use, notwithstanding an agreement between the parties
specifying the intended duration of the restrictions." Id. at 851.
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LUREs acquired under federal conservation programs is aberrant or
hostile.
As established by the Supreme Court in Little Lake Misere,
where a state law is not aberrant or hostile, the analysis of whether
to incorporate state law must include the "variety of consider-
ations" relevant to the specific governmental interests and to the
effects upon them of applying state law."8 An assessment of the
factors contemplated by the Supreme Court can be gleaned from
case law" 9  and scholarly articles.4 ' The most relevant policy
considerations for a determination of whether federal or state laws
should govern the maximum permissible duration of LUREs in-
clude the following:
(1) the effect of applying state law on federal legisla-
tive goals;
(2) the possible gains from applying federal law;
(3) the balance of losses and gains at the local level
from non-integration of the national program with normal
state activities; and
(4) the distribution of powers between federal and state
governments, not only in its constitutional aspect, but in its
daily operation as well.
In addition to providing a framework for courts examining
existing federal programs which do not specify the governing law,
these factors provide an appropriate analysis for Congress to con-
sider in crafting legislation requiring the same type of policy deci-
sion. The following section of this article applies these policy
factors to resolve the question whether federal or state laws should
govern the maximum possible duration of LUREs under federal
conservation programs.451
448. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595 (1973).
449. See, e.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (applying state
law because it did not threaten an identifiable federal interest); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applying federal rule due to great need for uniformi-
ty); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (applying state law in areas of highly
developed state law, such as domestic relations); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (applying federal law to protect proprietary interests of the
United States).
450. See generally Field, supra note 406; Hill, supra note 406; Mishldn, supra note
405.
451. The factors set forth in the Congressional framework outlined above are consider-
ably intertwined. Although this analysis addresses the factors separately, many of the con-
siderations are relevant to more than one factor. For example, many of the considerations
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B. Application of the Policy-Making Framework
1. The Effect of State Law on Federal Legislative Goals
In making the policy decision, it is important to consider the
effect of state law incorporation on federal legislative goals. There
is no need to displace state law unless it poses a significant threat
to an identifiable federal goal or policy interest."2 The primary
goal of federal conservation legislation authorizing LUREs is to
protect environmentally significant lands through restrictions in the
LURE agreements.453 Furthermore, the legislative history of the
1990 Farm Bill indicates that a distinct goal of the conservation
programs is the attainment of long-term protection.'
Incorporation of state law to govern the maximum possible
duration of LUREs hinders long-term protection by precluding
enforcement of perpetual LUREs in some states. Traditional com-
mon law doctrines in some states could impede perpetuity, assign-
ability, and alienation of restrictive easements in gross.455 Further,
even in states which have legislatively authorized the use of con-
servation easements the federal government may still encounter dif-
ficulties enforcing perpetual LUREs due to statutory limitations.
While state statutes authorizing LUREs are designed to simplify
and clarify common law doctrines so that enforceable property
rights may be created, the statutes are diverse.4s  In particular,
the duration of statutory LUREs is an area of divergence among
the states.457 Although some statutes explicitly allow LUREs to
be held in perpetuity,45  others do not459 or have complicated
provisions regarding duration. For example, under California's stat-
flowing from the latter three factors could readily threaten federal interests, the primary
consideration of the initial factor. However, to maintain clarity of the analysis, consider-
ations are addressed in the context of the factor to which they are most relevant.
452. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
453. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)-(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (forestry conserva-
tion); 16 U.S.C. § 3472(a) (1988) (agricultural conservation); 16 U.S.C. § 3901(a)-(b)
(1988) (wetlands conservation).
454. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
456. See Atherton, supra note 34, at 62-63 (noting that state conservation statutes have
been drafted to meet the individual needs of each state).
457. Katz, supra note 30, at 389-90.
458. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51075(d) (West 1983); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-
202 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.34.220 (West 1991).
459. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, paras. 400-406 (Smith-Hurd 1992); McH. CoMP.
LAWs ANN. §§ 399.251-.256 (West 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.130 (West
Supp. 1992).
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ute, LUREs may not run for terms of less than ten years; further-
more, LUREs running for a term of years must provide that on the
anniversary of the date of acceptance, one year will be added auto-
matically to the initial term unless written notice of non-renewal is
given.' 6  The resulting duration is a "perpetual ten-year
term."461
More significantly, most state statutes authorize LUREs only
for specified purposes and prescribe qualified holders.462 Although
some state statutes use language encompassing the federal govern-
ment,4 3 many exclude the federal government from the list of
qualified LURE holders.4(4 In states where the federal govern-
ment is not explicitly authorized to hold LUREs, state common law
presumably controls." Thus, the federal government may experi-
ence difficulty enforcing the terms of its LUREs, especially a term
requiring perpetual duration. For example, a subsequent landowner
may challenge the validity of a LURE held by the federal govern-
ment under a program providing that duration is the maximum
term permitted under applicable state law. Because the state statute
does not authorize the federal government to hold LUREs, the
applicable state law is the state's common law. The common law
of the state may render the LURE unenforceable by the federal
government either because it is a negative easement or because it
is an easement in gross.
Incorporation of state law also subjects the LURE to potential
460. CAL. GOVT CODE § 51081 (West 1983).
461. Atherton, supra note 34, at 65 n.29.
462. Katz, supra note 30, at 386-87. The legislative restraints stem from the traditional
reluctance to encourage the use of negative easements in gross. See id.
463. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 399.253 (West 1988) (authorizing any "gov-
ernmental entity" to acquire conservation easements); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.130
(West Supp. 1992) (authorizing any -federal agency" to acquire conservation easements);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-6-106 (1991) (authorizing any "public body" to acquire interests
in real property for the purpose of preservation).
464. For example, California's LURE provisions state that only the following entities or
organizations may acquire the authorized LUREs: (1) tax-exempt nonprofit organizations
qualified under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, qualified to do business in
the state, and organized for the primary purpose of preservation, protection or enhance-
ment of land; and (2) the state or any city, county, city or county, district, or other state
or local governmental entity. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.3(a)-(b) (West 1982). Similarly,
Illinois' conservation rights statute authorizes an owner of realty to convey a LURE to
"an agency of the State, to a unit of local government, or to a not-for-profit corporation
or trust." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 402 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
465. Cf. Katz, supra note 30, at 389 (noting that when statutes fail to mention duration,
LUREs are presumably governed by applicable state law).
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conflicts between perpetual duration and a state's marketable title
laws. Marketable title acts generally render non-possessory interests
in realty invalid unless the holder of the interest re-records notice
of the interest within a designated number of years.' 6 Even in
those states which have statutorily authorized perpetual LUREs, a
LURE may be unenforceable if the state has not expressly resolved
inconsistencies with its marketable title laws in the event that the
LURE holder inadvertently fails to re-record.467 In contrast, fed-
eral legislation authorizing LUREs to be perpetual despite state law
limitations on duration can preempt limitations stemming from
marketable title acts.'
Moreover, failure to designate the appropriate governing law
for federal LURE programs generates inefficiency and uncertainty.
When federal legislation does not address whether state or federal
law governs LURE duration, valid arguments can be made for
either outcome. Thus, enforceability often requires judicial interpre-
tation. Reliance on judicial enforcement, however, is an inefficient,
unpredictable means to attain conservation goals. A court analyzing
the "variety of considerations" under a federal program that does
not state whether federal or state law applies could conceivably
choose either option.'
In sum, even though state laws limiting the duration of LURES
may not be definitively characterized as aberrant or hostile, incor-
poration of state law could readily hinder federal legislative goals
by preventing long-term protection of environmentally significant
lands.
2. The Possible Gains from Prescribing a Federal Rule
The most significant gain from the use of an express federal
directive is the achievement of lasting conservation goals. As not-
466. See, e.g., FLA. STA. ANN. § 712.05 (West 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 27 § 605
(1989). Katz has suggested LUREs could be exempted from the effect of marketable title
acts if they were recorded in a separate index. Katz, supra note 30, at 395.
467. See Dana & Ramsey, supra note 26, at 20 (quoting Charles Boetsch, Conservation
Restrictions: A Survey, 8 CONN. L REV. 383, 407 (1975-76)). Although the drafters of
the Uniform Conservation Easement Act pointed out the conflict between marketable title
acts and perpetual duration of non-possessory interests, they did not suggest a resolution.
Katz, supra note 30, at 395.
468. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2103c(k)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that no conserva-
tion easement held by the federal government "shall be limited in duration or scope or be
defeasible by ... any requirement under State law for re-recordation or renewal of the
easement").
469. See supra notes 400-08 and accompanying text.
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ed, a federal directive yields readily enforceable rights that are not
impaired by common law or statutory limitations. Linked with the
achievement of lasting conservation is the significant gain from
protecting the investment of public funds. That is, ensuring en-
forceability protects the proprietary interests of the United States.
In addition, given the potential for successful takings argu-
ments,47 a federal directive will allow LURE acquisition pro-
grams to continue to proliferate. Federal legislation governing the
maximum duration of LUREs will enable the federal government to
continue conservation programs despite potential roadblocks created
by states. For example, as acquisitions of federal LUREs increase,
states may become concerned about the quantity of acreage con-
trolled by the federal government.47 1 Alternatively, once the mon-
etary payments end, state residents may become dissatisfied with
LURE restrictions,472 or subsequent owners who did not negotiate
the LUREs may seek to have them invalidated. 473 Responding to
these concerns, state legislatures may attempt to limit the federal
government's ability to acquire LUREs or the duration of such
agreements, undermining the continued success of LURE acquisi-
tion programs for conservation purposes.
Although states may not enact and retroactively apply adverse
laws to deprive the federal government of negotiated terms in
LURE agreements,474 statutory incorporation of state law govern-
ing LURE duration permits states to prospectively impose limita-
tions. Cases examining prospective applications of hostile state
law4' are overruled by express incorporation of state law and
470. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
471. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 319-20 n.23 (1983) (state
law limiting duration of wetland LUREs attributable, in part, to state dissatisfaction with
amount of land encumbered by permanent LUREs); Sabine River Auth. v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 745 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (Fish and Wildlife Service's LURE
conflicted with state agency's land use plans), af'd, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
60 U.S.L.W. 3843 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-1929).
472. Cf. Incentive Programs Can Help You Meet Conservation Compliance Re-
quirements, NEWSLETrER (Center for Rural Affairs, Walthill, Neb.) June 1990, at 3 (noting
the LURE requirement for partial field enrollments in the CRP may discourage farmers
from participating because, although the LUREs themselves may last longer, the annual
installment payments may not exceed ten years).
473. See, e.g., United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974) (subsequent
landowner attempted to defeat validity of LURE which restricted the draining of surface
water to preserve a waterfowl production area).
474. North Dakota, 460 U.S. at 320-21; United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 596-97 (1973).
475. Eg., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 692 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D. Cal. 1988); see also supra
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thus do not protect federal programs. Federal legislation expressly
permitting perpetual LUREs despite state law limitations will there-
fore provide critical protection for the continued viability of federal
conservation programs.
The express preemption of state laws governing duration will
also enable the federal government to continue protecting environ-
mentally sensitive lands without raising federal land use control
controversies. Although LURE acquisition programs are a more
appropriate means for attaining federal conservation goals than
direct regulation4 6 this is true only if LURE programs achieve
long-term conservation goals.4' If LUREs run a significant risk
of not being perpetually enforceable, their use may cease to be the
more appropriate federal means. The alternative of direct land use
regulation raises takings challenges which may render conserving
the land resource fiscally impractical.7 s Accordingly, express fed-
eral preemption of state limits on duration will maintain the effec-
tiveness of LURE acquisition programs and avoid the necessity of
finding alternative means to achieve conservation goals.
Along similar lines, a federal directive will permit Congress to
continue its working partnership with the agricultural industry. At-
taining a lasting conservation legacy by protecting social rights in
environmentally significant land held by private individuals is an
important federal goal.479 Notably, because much of the land re-
source requiring protection is on agricultural land, that goal may be
politically feasible only within the context of voluntary incentive
programs.4Ws Yet Congress will continue using voluntary incentive
programs only if it can guarantee enforceability. And Congress
can assure protection in perpetuity only with express language
preempting state law limitations on the duration of LUREs.
Therefore, many significant gains at the federal level accrue
from the policy decision to enact federal legislation requiring per-
petual duration of LUREs acquired through federal conservation
programs.
text accompanying notes 377-80.
476. See supra part H.
477. See supra part I.B.
478. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
480. See discussion supra part H.A.I.
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3. The Balance of Losses and Gains at the Local Level
Federal legislation authorizing perpetual LUREs and preempting
state laws may result in losses from non-integration with normal
state activities. States have well developed bodies of law governing
the acquisition and transfer of property and defining the resulting
rights and responsibilities.4" These laws reflect each state's pub-
lic policy choices. 4 2 Allowing the federal government to acquire
or convey rights in real property beyond those recognized by a
state alters the normal conduct or real estate transactions within the
state. Losses include encumbering land essential for development
with perpetual LUREs, perceived infringements, on the notion that
land use decisions rest with state or local governments, 43 and the
potential effect on local land values caused by perpetual
LUREs. 4
84
Upon closer examination, these perceived losses are not com-
pelling. Concerns regarding the loss of local control over land use
and development decisions can be mitigated by provisions in feder-
al conservation programs expressly allowing the federal government
to modify or terminate LUREs.485 For example, the WRP permits
modification of LUREs acquired under the program if needed to
facilitate the administration of the program or to achieve other
appropriate or consistent goals.4"6 LURES may be terminated if
the landowner agrees and termination is in the public interest.
487
Although states will be required to seek modification or termination
of LUREs and to demonstrate a sufficient public need, important
state or local development will not be precluded by the presence of
LUREs created under federal conservation programs.
Concerns regarding land values are misplaced because the
481. See Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 591; Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver
County, 328 U.S. 204, 208-10 (1946).
482. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 328 U.S. at 210 ("Concepts of real property are deeply
rooted in state traditions, customs, habits, and laws.").
483. See Lawrence MacDonnell, Federal Interests in Western Water Resources: Conflict
and Accommodation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 389, 390 (1989) (discussing western hostility
to f deral control of state water resources).
484. Concern over decreasing land values may be a residual notion stemming from early
reluctance to hinder alienation of realty. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
485. Eg., 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837e(b)(l)-(2), 3839d(B)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1990).
486. Id. § 3837e(b)(1)(A)-(B).
487. Id. § 3837e(b)(2)(A). However, at least 90 days before terminating LUREs acquired
under the WRP, the Secretary must give written notice to the House Committee on Agri-
culture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. Id. §
3837e(b)(2)(B).
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federal government fairly compensates landowners for LUREs.488
Owners who agree to encumber their lands with a LURE derive
adequate compensation from the transaction, and subsequent land-
owners purchase the property at a value determined in light the
LURE. Moreover, LURE agreements can be drafted so that
property values are maintained. The provisions in the 1990 Farm
Bill requiring the FmHA to place perpetual LUREs on wetlands
which come into the federal inventory are an excellent model for
designing LUREs to maintain the productive capabilities of
land.4 9 These steps should go far to preserving the marketability
of land. Furthermore, because encumbered lands remain on state
property tax rolls, LUREs do not adversely affect state reve-
nues.4 Potential losses-are therefore more perceived than real.
Conversely, significant gains occur at the local level from
federal conservation programs permitting enforceable, perpetual
LUREs. First, local gains flow from avoiding Fifth Amendment
takings controversies. Although probable, it is not definitively clear
that direct regulation of uses of agricultural lands for conservation
purposes would in fact constitute a taking.49' Thus, if the Su-
preme Court decides that a particular regulation is not a taking,
Congress could control land use decisions without compensating.
the landowner, resulting in a direct loss of income to the farmer.
Further, farmers would also lose income indirectly because they
cannot readily absorb the cost of direct regulation.41 By contrast,
LURE acquisition programs guarantee the landowner fair compen-
sation for voluntary land use restrictions.493 However, LURE ac-
quisition programs will only be used if Congress can assure the en-
forceability of LUREs in perpetuity. Hence, the use of a federal
directive assures that agricultural landowners will be fairly compen-
sated for the imposition of land use restrictions.
On the other hand, if direct regulations are consistently deemed
takings, Congress may find the potential for costly ad hoc inverse
condemnation proceedings fiscally impractical.4 Congress' may
then ,simply forego affirmative conservation of our diverse land
488. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
489. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 19 85(g)( 2 )-(3 ) (West Supp. 1992); see also supra notes 89-93
and accompanying text (discussing same).
490. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
491. See discussion supra pan ILA.2.
492. See discussion supra part H1A.3.
493. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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resource. Yet an agricultural landowner's stewardship often encom-
passes managed land use for the future.4" These landowners may
voluntarily restrict their use of the land without any affirmative
conservation initiatives. Without affirmative federal conservation
programs, farmers might forego the opportunity to derive a fair
income for restricting their use of the land. Fair compensation
accrues gains at the local level because farmers are able to contrib-
ute more readily to the local economy.
Furthermore, a number of other less significant gains result
from federal legislation authorizing the acquisition and en-
forceability of perpetual LUREs. The terms of LURE agreements
often allow landowners to use the land for fishing, hunting, or
wildlife habitats.49 Because these uses may draw people for rec-
reational or scientific purposes, local commerce may benefit over
the years.4" Additionally, conservation of significant aspects of
the land typically enhances aesthetic quality, ultimately increasing
property values in the long run.498 Finally, most states recognize
the importance of long-term conservation or preservation of the
land resource in order to maintain the viability and productive
capabilities of land within their boundaries, yet lack the requisite
funds to operate effective state acquisition programs.4" Thus,
states benefit from federal LURE programs that achieve conserva-
tion and preservation goals on their behalf. Balancing the gains and
losses at the local level, the gains from federal legislation ensuring
long-term and effective conservation outweigh the losses from non-
integration with normal state activities.
4. The Distribution of Power
The distribution of power between the federal and state govern-
495. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
496. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 3837a(d), 3839(b)(4) (Supp. 1990) (detailing land uses
compatible with LUREs acquired under the WRP and the EEP).
497. See Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 1984) (allowing Congress to
regulate the discharge of dredged fill material into Lake Utah because as an outlet for
recreational activities, the lake benefitted local and interstate commerce).
498. See Konrad 1. Liegel, Note, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Life-
time Transfers of Appreciated Property for Conservation Purposes, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
742, 768 (1989) (noting that restrictions may enhance the value of land for recreational or
residential purposes if neighboring properties are subject to similar restrictions).
499. See David Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource Management: A Prag-
matic Perspective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 635 n.45 (1983) (noting state and
local opposition to land acquisition proposals usually centers on the high cost and lack of
available funds for such programs).
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ments is an important congressional consideration. Federal legisla-
tion requiring LUREs under federal conservation programs to be
perpetual despite contrary state laws does not overstep fundamental
federalism principles.' Nevertheless, it is still important to con-
sider perceived infringements on the proper distribution of pow-
er.
5o l
Federal legislation authorizing enforceable, perpetual LUREs
may be viewed as a form of federal land use regulation.' Land
use controls are historically considered within the sphere of state
and local authorities.' Yet many aspects of land and resource
management have necessarily shifted to the federal government
over the years. Indeed, the "quiet federalization" of land use con-
trols has been commonly noted.-"' Quiet federalization began in
the 1960s when the federal government took steps to address envi-
ronmental problems attracting sufficient public concern.' In
present times, federal regulation of land use is pervasive.' Thus,
historical deference to the traditional notion of land use control is
an insufficient reason to inhibit legitimate federal policies promot-
ing conservation and preservation of the land resource.'
In addition to the constitutional aspect of the relative powers
between the federal and state governments, it is important to con-
sider the effect of federal legislation on the daily operation or
administration of governmental programs.' In this context, the
appropriate distribution of powers between federal and state gov-
ernments should be governed by practicality. A federal directive
requiring LUREs to be perpetual is practical because it enables the
government to acquire LUREs throughout the country more effi-
ciently. Incorporation of state laws will require the federal govern-
500. See discussion supra part IM.
501. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L REV. 489 (1954) (discussing respective roles of federal and state law in
the "affirmative governance of private activities").
502. Cf. Caldweli, supra note 157, at 330-34 (discussing the tension between social
environmental interests and individual ownership interests); Torres, supra note 209 at 204-
05 (discussing the problems uniform federal groundwater regulations create for heteroge-
neous state farms).
503. See supra notes 225, 408-10 and accompanying text.
504. See, e.g., FRED P. BOsSELMAN Er AL, FEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION 1
(1977).
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. MacDonnell, supra note 483, at 408 (citing A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Spe-
cies Act & Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 29 (1985)).
508. See Hart, supra note 501, at 490-91; Mishlin, supra note 405, at 812.
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ment to continually monitor state laws regarding the permissible
duration of LUREs, to adjust negotiations accordingly, and to draft
LURE agreements in compliance with the multitude of diverse state
statutes authorizing LUREs. Further, the difficult problem of valua-
tion is exacerbated by incorporation of state law. Placing a mone-
tary value on a perpetual LURE is difficult, ' yet it is even
more difficult to assess distinct, appropriate values for LUREs that
will only endure for a certain term of years. Such considerations
suggest that incorporation of state law will necessitate additional
time and money to implement LURE acquisition programs, result-
ing in a less efficient expenditure of public funds.
In the agricultural arena, federal agencies often work directly
with local advisory committees. The 1990 Farm Bill called for the
establishment of technical advisory committees in each state to
assist in the implementation of the conservation provisions. 511 Al-
though the committees do not accord the state any authority in
administering the conservation programs, they provide an opportu-
nity for input at the local level regarding which lands to protect.
Thus, even if federal legislation dictates the acquisition of perpetual
LUREs despite contrary state laws, conservation programs will be
implemented with a healthy degree of federal-state cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION
Consideration of the policy factors indicates that federal law
should require LUREs acquired through federal conservation pro-
grams to be perpetual despite state laws limiting duration. Federal
preemption of state laws limiting LURE duration constitutes a
stronger conservation policy than wholesale incorporation of state
law. A federal directive will yield enforceable, perpetual rights
protecting the land resource, will assure the continued viability of
LURE acquisition programs, will enhance efficient implementation
of conservation programs, and will not preclude important state or
local development.
Federal LURE acquisition programs for conservation and pres-
ervation purposes are likely to proliferate as recent developments
render it more feasible for courts to find direct regulation of land
use to be a taking, and fiscal constraints on both states and the
federal government continue. Thus, formulating effective and effi-
509. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
510. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3861-3862 (Supp. H 1990).
[Vol 43:401
1993 PERPETUAL CONSERVA77ON 489
cient legislation authorizing the use of perpetual LUREs is impera-
tive. Federal legislation authorizing the acquisition of enforceable,
perpetual LUREs despite state law limitations on duration will go a
long way toward achieving federal conservation goals and assuring
desired long-term protection of our nation's land resource.

